dsl-vm-reverse skill
Reverse JavaScript-based custom DSL/VM interpreters, non-standard WASM-like runtimes, and risk-control engines. Use when analyzing IIFE or switch-based opcode dispatchers, extracting instruction tables, recovering bytecode semantics, capturing VM state at runtime, or reconstructing execution flow.
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Install the dsl-vm-reverse skill
A skill is a folder. Copy it into your agent's skills folder and the agent loads it when the task matches its description.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill.git /tmp/reverse-skill mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills cp -r /tmp/reverse-skill/skills/reverse-engineering/dsl-vm-reverse ~/.claude/skills/dsl-vm-reverse
In the Claude apps, zip the folder and upload it from the Skills settings. The folder on GitHub
The instructions your agent would load
SKILL.md as published, without the frontmatter. Read it on GitHub
🔄 DSL 自定义虚拟机逆向(DSL VM Reverse Engineering)
ACTION REQUIRED(读完后立刻执行)
- NOW: 确认当前任务是自定义 JS opcode VM / 风控引擎,不是标准 WASM 或普通 webpack
- NOW: case-init 直到 scope.md 就绪;离线样本用 offline / lab
- ACT: 从「3. 通用逆向工作流」Phase 1 做文件分类,不要停在目录
用于逆向基于 JavaScript 实现的自定义 WASM 虚拟机/风控引擎
目录
- 1. 适用范围
- 2. DSL VM 识别特征
- 3. 通用逆向工作流
- 4. Opcode 提取与分类
- 5. 运行时捕获方案
- 6. 常见状态码
- 7. Skill 自检清单
1. 适用范围
当目标文件符合以下 任意特征 时使用本 skill:
排除规则
2. DSL VM 识别特征
代码特征
// 特征 1: IIFE 入口,单字母变量映射数字常量
!function(){
var U=void 0, y=parseInt, E0=Function, AN=Uint8Array;
var E=15, l=10, m=12, x=16, S=13, $=11;
// 数字常量映射为变量名,替代原始数字
...
}
// 特征 2: 解释器主循环 DG()
function DG(C, d, ...) {
var d = []; // 数组模拟 WASM stack/locals
for (d[7] = x; d[7] !== U;) {
var aE = d[7] & 31; // 低 5 位 = opcode
var O = d[7] >> 5 & 31; // 高 5 位 = sub-operation
switch (aE) {
case 0: /* ... */ d[7] = 612; break;
case 1: /* ... */
// ... N 个 case
}
}
}
// 特征 3: 常量表 C[9] 存储函数索引和字符串
// C[9][0] = ["pc"] → 函数参数描述
// C[9][667] = "string" → 字符串常量
// C[9][x] = number → 函数索引
// 特征 4: W(C[index], null, ...) 调用模式
// W = Function.prototype.call.bind(call)
// 所有内置函数通过 C[index] 索引调用
// 特征 5: 指令编码格式
// d[7] = opcode(bit 0-4) | subop(bit 5-9) | operand(bit 10+)Opcode 编码格式
每条指令编码为 32 位整数:
bit 0-4: opcode (0-N)
bit 5-9: sub-operation (0-31)
bit 10-31: operand/立即数
解码:
aE = d[7] & 31 → opcode
O = d[7] >> 5 & 31 → sub-operation
d[other] = d[7] >> 10 → operand3. 通用逆向工作流
Phase 1: 文件分类(5 分钟)
# 检查是否为 DSL VM
python3 << 'EOF'
with open('target.js', 'rb') as f:
head = f.read(100)
# 1. 检查 WASM 魔术字
if head[:4] == b'\x00asm':
print("标准 WASM 二进制")
exit()
# 2. 检查零字节占比
data = open('target.js', 'rb').read()
zero_pct = data.count(b'\x00') / len(data) * 100
print(f"零字节占比: {zero_pct:.1f}%")
if zero_pct > 20:
print("WASM 二进制")
elif head[:2] == b'!f':
# 检查单字母变量模式
if b'var U=void 0' in head or b'U=void 0,y=parseInt' in head:
print("→ DSL VM!")
else:
print("普通 JS IIFE")
EOFPhase 2: 变量映射表提取(10 分钟)
import re
with open('target.js', 'r', errors='replace') as f:
s = f.read()
# 提取开头 2000 字符的 var X=数字 映射
mappings = re.findall(r'var\s+(\w+)\s*=\s*(\d+)', s[:2000])
print('常量映射:')
for name, val in mappings:
print(f" {name:4s} = {val:3d} (0x{int(val):02x})")Phase 3: Opcode 提取与分类(15 分钟)
# 1. 提取所有 case
all_cases = re.findall(r'case\s+(\d+):', s)
unique = sorted(set(int(c) for c in all_cases))
print(f"总 case: {len(all_cases)} 个")
print(f"唯一 opcode: {len(unique)} 个: {unique}")
# 2. 分类每个 opcode
for op in unique:
idx = s.find(f'case {op}:')
snippet = s[idx:idx+200]
if 'd[7]=' in snippet:
op_type = 'BRANCH'
elif 'return' in snippet:
op_type = 'RETURN'
elif 'W(C[' in snippet:
op_type = 'CALL'
elif 'new' in snippet:
op_type = 'ALLOC'
elif 'try' in snippet or 'catch' in snippet:
op_type = 'EXCEPTION'
else:
op_type = 'ARITH/STORE'
print(f" opcode {op:2d}: {op_type}")Phase 4: 常量表分析(30 分钟)
const_refs = re.findall(r'C\[9\]\[(\d+)\]', s)
unique_refs = sorted(set(int(x) for x in const_refs))
print(f"C[9] 引用: {len(unique_refs)} 个索引")
print(f"范围: {min(unique_refs)} - {max(unique_refs)}")
# 对每个引用分析上下文
for ref in unique_refs[:20]:
idx = s.find(f'C[9][{ref}]')
ctx = s[max(0,idx-50):idx+80]
clean = ''.join(c if c.isprintable() else ' ' for c in ctx)
print(f" C[9][{ref}] → {clean}")Phase 5: 导出函数追踪(1-2 小时)
导出函数(如 getToken)通过以下路径定位:
1. 找 AWSCInner.register() 或类似注册调用
2. 确定注册的模块和工厂函数
3. 找工厂函数返回的对象 → 导出函数定义位置
4. 若函数名不在 JS 中 → 在 C[9] 常量表中作字节码存储
5. 追踪调用链:
AWSCInner._modules['fy'].getToken()
→ W(C[函数索引], null, ...)
→ DG() 解释器执行编码后的指令序列Phase 6: 运行时注入(若纯静态分析不够)
// 注入最小 AWSC 兼容环境
const fakeEnv = {
AWSCInner: {
_modules: {},
register(name, moduleName, factory) {
this._modules[moduleName] = factory();
}
}
};
// 执行 DSL VM 代码
dslVmCode();
// 获取导出
const token = fakeEnv.AWSCInner._modules['fy'].getToken({});4. Opcode 提取与分类
参考 opcode 对照表(基于已有案例)
5. 运行时捕获方案
方案 A: Selenium + CDP 原生事件(推荐,成功率最高)
from selenium import webdriver
driver = webdriver.Chrome()
# 注入反检测
driver.execute_cdp_cmd("Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument", {
"source": r"""
Object.defineProperty(navigator, 'webdriver', {get: () => false});
Object.defineProperty(navigator, 'plugins', {get: () => [1,2,3,4,5]});
Object.defineProperty(navigator, 'languages', {get: () => ['zh-CN','zh','en']});
"""
})
# 发送 CDP 原生鼠标事件
driver.execute_cdp_cmd("Input.dispatchMouseEvent", {
"type": "mousePressed",
"x": 549.5, "y": 441.2,
"button": "left", "buttons": 1,
"clickCount": 1, "pointerType": "mouse"
})方案 B: Playwright 无头浏览器
const { chromium } = require('playwright');
async function run() {
const browser = await chromium.launch();
const page = await browser.newPage();
// 拦截网络请求
await page.route('**/api/**', async route => {
await route.continue_();
});
await page.goto('https://target-page.com');
// 等待 DSL VM 初始化
await page.waitForFunction(() => {
return window.AWSCInner &&
window.AWSCInner._modules &&
window.AWSCInner._modules['fy'];
});
// 执行操作
await page.mouse.move(500, 400);
await page.mouse.down();
// ... 操作序列
await page.mouse.up();
}方案 C: 纯协议验证(成功率极低)
DSL VM 生成的 token 通常与浏览器上下文强绑定(TLS JA3 指纹、IP、Cookie、请求头等),脱离浏览器后服务端可检测到上下文不匹配。不建议使用纯协议方案。
6. 常见状态码
7. Skill 自检清单
- [ ] 我是否完成了 DSL VM 识别(IIFE + 单字母变量 + DG() 解释器)?
- [ ] 我是否提取了变量映射表(var X=数字)?
- [ ] 我是否提取了 opcode 列表并分类?
- [ ] 我是否分析了常量表 C[9] 的引用范围?
- [ ] 我是否定位了导出函数注册点?
- [ ] 纯静态分析不够时,我是否尝试了运行时注入方案?
- [ ] 任务完成后是否回写了 field-journal?
- [ ] 是否发现新工具/新场景 → 更新 routing.md?
路由注册
路径交叉
DSL VM 逆向路径:
reverse-engineering/dsl-vm-reverse/ → Phase 1-6 工作流
↓ 若需要捕获运行时数据
browser-automation/ → Playwright/Selenium CDP
↓ 若需要分析 API 协议层
js-reverse/ → Observe→Capture→RebuildMore skills from zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill
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