hunt-dispatch skill
Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator. Fingerprints the target, picks the right platform attack skills, and loads the Red Team or WAPT skill set. Use when /hunt has just received a mode answer (redteam or wapt + blackbox|greybox) and needs to load the appropriate skills and print the taxonomy. Not for direct user invocation.
Is the hunt-dispatch skill safe?
Clean: nothing in its files matched our rules. We read 1 file in the folder on 2026-09-28.
No findings.
Install the hunt-dispatch skill
A skill is a folder. Copy it into your agent's skills folder and the agent loads it when the task matches its description.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter.git /tmp/Claude-BugHunter mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills cp -r /tmp/Claude-BugHunter/skills/hunt-dispatch ~/.claude/skills/hunt-dispatch
In the Claude apps, zip the folder and upload it from the Skills settings. The folder on GitHub
The instructions your agent would load
SKILL.md as published, without the frontmatter. Read it on GitHub
hunt-dispatch
skill-set loader for /hunt. one concept (which skills to load), one place.
engagement context
every skill loaded below operates under one frame, and it holds for the whole session:
when they invoked /hunt. testing stays inside it. an out-of-scope host ends the run — it does not widen it.
- authorized and scope-bounded. the operator asserted written authorization for the named scope
exists, written so the owner can remediate it. enough to demonstrate impact; no further.
- the output is a finding, not an exploit. the deliverable is a reproducible proof that a defect
- remediation is the point. these skills exist so defects get fixed by the people who own them.
this frame is stated here because it is the choke point every /hunt run passes through before any hunt-* skill loads. it is not a prompt and needs no answer.
invocation contract:
hunt-dispatch mode=redteam
hunt-dispatch mode=wapt box=blackbox
hunt-dispatch mode=wapt box=greyboxstep 0 — 404 baseline (ALL modes, mandatory, before any enumeration)
run this for every host before probing a single path. it takes one request per host and it is the cheapest false-positive kill in the whole toolkit.
many modern estates (SPA / Next.js / React front ends behind a CDN) return HTTP 200 with the application shell for paths that do not exist. a status code therefore proves nothing. without a recorded control, /.well-known/security.txt, /api/revalidate, /nextjsoriginal-stack-frame and /nextjslaunch-editor all "exist" on a host where none of them do.
for H in $HOSTS; do
# two independent bogus paths — if they agree, that IS the soft-404 signature
for P in /zzz-nope-12345 /qqq-other-98765; do
printf "%-34s %-20s " "$H" "$P"
curl -sk -m 12 -o /tmp/b -w "%{http_code} %{size_download} " "https://$H$P"
shasum /tmp/b | cut -c1-12
done
donerecord per host: status, byte length, body hash. that triple is the control.
the rule: no path is "found" until its response differs from the control. a 200 that matches the control hash is a soft 404. a 404 whose body differs from the control may be a real handler. compare bodies, never status codes alone.
re-derive the baseline per host — it differs across an estate. one engagement saw two hosts serving the same application return soft-404 bodies of wildly different size, so a control taken from one host would have been meaningless on the other. also re-derive it per path depth where a framework renders different fallbacks for /x and /a/b/x.
edge pages are not origin findings: a CDN "Access Denied" / "Unsupported Request" body means the request never reached the application. classify it as edge behaviour and move on.
step 1 — fingerprint (red team only)
fingerprint every live host, not just the apex. for multi-host / wildcard targets the platform-skill routing must be driven by all banners, not one host's.
use -L (follow redirects) — identity-provider and CDN signals (login.microsoftonline.com, okta, auth0, CDN banners) routinely sit behind a 30x, so a no-redirect curl -sI silently misses those matches. pull both headers and the landing-page HTML (NEXTDATA, VIEWSTATE, laravelsession, Ignition, framework markers live in the body, not headers).
HOSTS="$TARGET"
if [ -f "recon/$TARGET/live-hosts.txt" ]; then
HOSTS=$(cat "recon/$TARGET/live-hosts.txt")
fi
for H in $HOSTS; do
echo "=== $H ==="
# -L follow redirects, -D - dump headers, -o body; cap body to keep context small
curl -sSL -m 12 -D - -o /tmp/fp_body "https://$H" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r'
# surface body-only platform markers
grep -aoE '__NEXT_DATA__|/_next/|VIEWSTATE|rO0[AB]|laravel_session|Ignition|Telescope|Whitelabel|/actuator|application/grpc|socket\.io|swagger|\.js\.map' \
/tmp/fp_body | sort -u
done
rm -f /tmp/fp_bodyif live-hosts.txt is absent, the loop still runs once against $TARGET. record which signal came from which host — a platform skill matched on host B does not imply host A runs that stack.
look for the following signals → platform skill mapping:
okta.com | auth0.com | pingidentity → okta-attack
login.microsoftonline.com | outlook | sts → m365-entra-attack
pulse | fortinet | ivanti | citrix → enterprise-vpn-attack
vsphere | vcenter | :9443 → vmware-vcenter-attack
amazonaws | azure | googleapis | gcp → cloud-iam-deep
github.com/<org>/ → supply-chain-attack-recon
.apk | play.google.com → apk-redteam-pipeline
MongoDB | mongoose | CouchDB | Redis → hunt-nosqli
?page= | ?file= | ?path= | php wrapper → hunt-lfi
rO0A | VIEWSTATE | rememberMe cookie → hunt-deserialization
Access-Control-Allow-Origin header → hunt-cors
/forgot-password | /reset | X-Forwarded → hunt-host-header
?redirect= | ?next= | ?return= | ?url= → hunt-open-redirect
OTP | /verify | /2fa | no-rate-limit → hunt-brute-force
Set-Cookie session | PHPSESSID → hunt-session
Active Directory | LDAP | OpenLDAP | ADFS → hunt-ldap
__NEXT_DATA__ | /_next/ | buildId → hunt-nextjs
X-Powered-By: Express | Node.js | .js stack → hunt-nodejs
postMessage | dangerouslySetInnerHTML → hunt-dom
WebSocket | conflict resolution & load budget
real targets almost always return multiple signals at once — e.g. a single host can show Cloudflare (CDN) + login.microsoftonline.com (redirect) + NEXTDATA__ (Next.js front end) + amazonaws (origin) simultaneously. loading every match blindly can pull 20-plus skills and blow the context window, drowning the high-signal skill in noise. apply this precedence and cap:
priority order (load highest tiers first, stop at the cap):
tier 1 identity / SSO fabric okta-attack, m365-entra-attack
(own the auth boundary — highest blast radius if compromised)
tier 2 perimeter appliances enterprise-vpn-attack, vmware-vcenter-attack
(pre-auth RCE / direct internal foothold)
tier 3 cloud / IAM cloud-iam-deep, hunt-cloud-misconfig
(credential → lateral movement)
tier 4 app framework / stack hunt-nextjs, hunt-nodejs, hunt-laravel,
hunt-springboot, hunt-aspnet, hunt-sharepoint
tier 5 protocol / class signals hunt-nosqli, hunt-lfi, hunt-deserialization,
hunt-cors, hunt-host-header, hunt-open-redirect, hunt-grpc,
hunt-websocket, hunt-dom, hunt-k8s, hunt-cicd, hunt-source-leak,
hunt-tls-network, hunt-ldap, hunt-brute-force, hunt-sessionload budget: cap platform-skill loads at 8. if more than 8 match, keep the highest-tier 8 and drop the rest; print the dropped ones under deferred: in the taxonomy block so they can be loaded on demand later.
de-dup rules (avoid loading two skills for the same evidence):
fingerprints the edge, not the app. do not load a skill for it; note it for hunt-cache-poison / hunt-http-smuggling, which the mode set already carries.
- CDN banner alone (Cloudflare/Akamai/Fastly) is not a platform match — it
the same string found as a leaked key/JSON in a JS bundle or APK → still cloud-iam-deep, but flag it as a live-credential lead (higher priority, tier 3 becomes tier 1 for that host).
- amazonaws / azure / googleapis in a header/origin → cloud-iam-deep.
signal (?redirect=, Access-Control-Allow-Origin) on the same host → load the framework skill (tier 4) and keep the class skill only if budget remains; the WAPT/redteam mode set already loads the common class skills unconditionally.
- a framework marker (NEXTDATA, laravelsession) and a generic class
step 2 — load skill set
invoke each skill in order via the Skill tool.
mode=redteam
always-on (load first):
redteam-mindset
mid-engagement-ir-detectionplatform (load second, conditional on fingerprint matches from step 1):
okta-attack
m365-entra-attack
enterprise-vpn-attack
vmware-vcenter-attack
cloud-iam-deep
supply-chain-attack-recon
apk-redteam-pipelinehigh-impact hunt-* set (load third):
hunt-rce
hunt-sqli
hunt-ssrf
hunt-ato
hunt-auth-bypass
hunt-saml
hunt-oauth
hunt-mfa-bypass
hunt-file-upload
hunt-http-smuggling
hunt-cloud-misconfig
hunt-sharepoint
hunt-aspnetreport format: redteam-report-template (subject / observations / description / impact / recommendation / poc).
mode=wapt
always-on:
bb-methodology
security-arsenal
triage-validationfull hunt-* set (all OWASP-relevant):
hunt-xss hunt-sqli hunt-ssrf hunt-idor
hunt-csrf hunt-xxe hunt-rce hunt-graphql
hunt-oauth hunt-saml hunt-mfa-bypass hunt-auth-bypass
hunt-ato hunt-file-upload hunt-business-logic hunt-race-condition
hunt-llm-ai hunt-api-misconfig hunt-ssti hunt-cache-poison
hunt-http-smuggling hunt-subdomain hunt-cloud-misconfig hunt-misc
hunt-aspnet hunt-sharepoint hunt-ntlm-info
hunt-lfi hunt-nosqli hunt-deserialization
hunt-cors hunt-host-header hunt-open-redirect
hunt-brute-force hunt-session hunt-ldap
hunt-nextjs hunt-nodejs hunt-dom
hunt-websocket hunt-grpc hunt-laravel
hunt-springboot hunt-k8s hunt-cicd
hunt-source-leak hunt-tls-networkreport format: report-writing (bugcrowd-reporting if the target is on bugcrowd).
box=greybox: creds already captured by /hunt, available in session memory.
do not fan out across the authenticated hunt-\ set until the creds are validated.** /hunt only prompts for and stores creds (commands/hunt.md) — it does not confirm they work. firing every authenticated test with dead, MFA-gated, or wrong-role creds wastes the whole run and produces false "no auth surface" conclusions. run a single low-cost auth preflight first:
# session-cookie creds: one authenticated GET against an identity echo endpoint
curl -sS -m 12 -b "$SESSION_COOKIE" "https://$TARGET/api/me" -w '\n%{http_code}\n'
# 200 + your username/email → live session, role visible in body
# 401/403 → dead or insufficient — STOP, re-auth
# bearer/JWT creds: same probe with Authorization
curl -sS -m 12 -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"https://$TARGET/api/me" -w '\n%{http_code}\n'
# raw user/pass: drive the real login flow once, capture Set-Cookie, then echo
# watch for an MFA / step-up challenge in the response — if present, the creds
# alone do not yield an authenticated session (see memory: operator-capability)confirm three things from the preflight, and record them for the hunt-\* skills:
role/tenant/scopes. IDOR and authz tests need a known baseline identity; a silently-admin or silently-readonly cred skews every authz finding.
More skills from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
- Aapk-redteam-pipelineEnd-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.
- Fbb-local-toolkitLocal-tooling companion to the bug-bounty orchestrator — carries the SAME complete bug-bounty workflow, but reach for THIS variant when you also need to resolve where tools, wordlists, and clones are installed on the local machine (jhaddix, SecLists, trufflehog, ffuf, dalfox, ghauri); for pure orchestration/routing use the bug-bounty skill. Workflow it covers — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use when you need the local install path of a tool / wordlist / clone for a hunt, or as the full-workflow variant when operating from this local toolkit; for general routing use the bug-bounty skill. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
- Abb-methodologyUse at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next. Master orchestrator that combines the 5-phase non-linear hunting workflow with the critical thinking framework (developer psychology, anomaly detection, What-If experiments). Routes to all other skills based on current hunting phase. Also use when asking "what should I do next" or "where am I in the process."
- Fbug-bountyComplete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use for ANY bug bounty task — starting a new target, doing recon, hunting specific vulns, auditing source code, testing AI features, validating findings, or writing reports. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
- Abugcrowd-reportingBugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation.
- Acloud-iam-deepCloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.
- Centerprise-vpn-attackExternal SSL VPN / remote-access appliance attack matrix — Cisco ASA/AnyConnect, Fortinet FortiGate/FortiOS, Citrix NetScaler/ADC, Palo Alto GlobalProtect, Pulse Secure / Ivanti Connect Secure, SonicWall, F5 Big-IP. Covers version fingerprinting, CVE matrix (2018-2026), AAA backend identification, default credentials, configuration-disclosure paths, pre-auth RCE/SSRF/path-traversal exploits where applicable. Built from authorized-engagement Cisco ASA testing plus 2024-2026 enterprise VPN CVE landscape. Use whenever the target's perimeter exposes any SSL VPN appliance or remote-access gateway — these are the most common initial-access points in 2024-2026 actor TTPs.
- Aevidence-hygieneEvidence-capture and PoC-redaction discipline for bug-bounty submissions: cookie redaction protocol (which fields to mask, Preview annotation / Burp panel hiding / DevTools workflow), PII black-bar discipline (what to mask in other-user data — names, emails, phones, faces — vs what is safe to leave — usernames, trace IDs, request bodies), HAR file sanitization (jq filters for Cookie/Set-Cookie/Authorization headers), Burp Repeater/Intruder screenshot hygiene (hide request body, show only Results table for rate-limit attacks), Chrome DevTools Console PoC patterns (credentials include so cookies are not echoed, labeled console.log), screenshot capture order, filename conventions, post-submission rotation hygiene. Use BEFORE any PoC screenshot, BEFORE attaching a HAR, or whenever preparing evidence with session cookies or other-user PII. Pairs with bugcrowd-reporting and report-writing.
- Ahunt-api-misconfigHunt API security misconfiguration — mass assignment, prototype pollution, HTTP verb tampering. Mass assignment: send {is_admin:true, role:admin, verified:true} on profile/account/reset endpoints — server blindly applies. JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) is owned by hunt-jwt-crypto; this skill covers only non-crypto JWT handling. Prototype pollution: __proto__ injection in JSON merge / Object.assign / lodash _.merge → polluted prototype reaches sink (RCE in Node, XSS in browser). HTTP verb: GET-bypass-CSRF, X-HTTP-Method-Override, TRACE enabled. Detection: API responses with extra fields, JWTs in headers (decode at jwt.io). CORS misconfiguration (reflect-any-origin, null origin, subdomain-regex bypass, postMessage) is owned by hunt-cors. Use when hunting API misconfigs, mass-assignment, prototype pollution (JWT crypto → hunt-jwt-crypto).
- Ahunt-aspnetHunt ASP.NET-specific surface — ViewState deserialization (signed-only vs encrypted), machineKey recovery, dual-parser MAC-bypass anti-pattern, request-validator bypass, trace.axd/elmah.axd disclosure, load-balanced ViewState cross-node failures, SafeControl enumeration via reflection, customErrors mode=Off stack-trace leaks, classic Webforms .aspx/.asmx/.svc surface. Built for ASP.NET Webforms + WCF + SharePoint farms.
- Ahunt-atoHunt account takeover taxonomy — 9 distinct paths to ATO, plus chains. Paths: (1) password reset flaws (host-header injection redirects token, predictable/numeric token, Referer leak, no-expiry/reuse), (2) email change without re-auth, (3) OAuth account-link CSRF, (4) MFA bypass (per hunt-mfa-bypass), (5) session fixation, (6) JWT manipulation (forge token to another identity; crypto details → hunt-jwt-crypto), (7) password change without step-up (chain with login timing/length oracle), (8) social-recovery / security-question brute-force, (9) SSO subdomain takeover at OAuth redirect_uri. Chains: cookie theft + password oracle + no step-up = persistent ATO; lax redirect_uri = auth-code theft; dangling-CNAME takeover at redirect_uri = ATO. Validate: demonstrate real takeover of test account B from attacker A's session; OOB/Collaborator confirm blind token-leak steps. Use when hunting ATO chains, testing password reset / email change / MFA / OAuth / session / JWT, or chaining primitives toward Critical.
- Ahunt-auth-bypassHunting skill for auth bypass vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports across SAML XSW / parser-differential (GitHub Enterprise CVE-2025-25291/25292), SAML signature stripping (Uber, Rocket.Chat, samlify CVE-2025-47949), SAML domain enforcement bypass via control characters (HackerOne 2024), partner-portal cross-IdP assertion reuse (Slack), WordPress XMLRPC bypassing SSO (Uber), JWT alg-confusion HS256/RS256 (Jitsi), JWT signature-validation skip (Linktree, Newspack), and token-audience confusion (Argo CD CVE-2023-22482). For standalone JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) see hunt-jwt-crypto; this skill covers JWT only inside SSO/SAML/token-trust bypass chains. SAML assertion-layer attacks (XSW, comment injection, signature stripping, XXE-in-assertion) are owned by hunt-saml; this skill owns the broader cross-protocol auth-bypass taxonomy. Use when hunting auth bypass — see the Legacy-Protocol Matrix for branded-UI vs legacy-endpoint patterns.