rustsdcmcp MCP server

rustsdcmcp

Async Rust Model Context Protocol server for HPE Juniper Security Director Cloud a mechub project — sovereign network-security automation

Unofficial / community project. This is an independent community project

and does not claim affiliation with or endorsement by Hewlett Packard

Enterprise or Juniper Networks. Product names and trademarks are used only to

identify the systems with which the software interoperates.

rustsdcmcp exposes HPE Juniper Security Director Cloud (SDC) to MCP clients as a bounded, auditable tool surface. SDC is the HPE Juniper SASE portal for an SRX estate, so this server talks to that management plane rather than to any single firewall. Where rustjunosmcp talks NETCONF to individual SRX devices, rustsdcmcp talks HTTPS REST to the portal that governs them.

That distinction has a large blast radius: one SDC action can affect many managed SRX devices. Strict approval, credential-safe attribution, and bounded I/O therefore protect the management plane rather than merely decorate it.

Current status

rustsdcmcp exposes 78 MCP tools (v0.3.1 and main; v0.2.0 shipped 74): 60 bounded read tools and 18 change-control tools. The surface covers the part of the SDC API that manages SRX devices and their policy; the rest of the product's API is deliberately out of scope.

Every mutation is reachable only through prepare → independent approval → apply. A wildcard token scope deliberately grants no write tool, so each must be named explicitly when a token is minted.

Live validation against SDC has gone well beyond read-only. On 2026-08-07 a full prepare → approve → apply policy deploy ran against the lab tenant and reached a managed vSRX, which is how the co-management behaviour in #23 was discovered: within hierarchies SDC owns, objects not reachable from a policy SDC imported are deleted on deploy. Interfaces, routing, system, and the management instance were untouched. The full boundary and the observed diff are in docs/operations.md. JobStatus and DeviceStatusEntry are validated against live preview and deploy responses.

On 2026-08-12 the certificate and licence readers, BulkSyncDevices, and the template endpoints were exercised live. Device sync imports into SDC rather than pushing to the device, but reconciles inventory only and does not clear deviceconfigstate: OUTOFBAND_CHANGED.

Read-path security properties were last verified live on 2026-08-07 against commit ea81805d2b4b97df9bdd3f70423e047524896a3d with mecmcp v0.5.0. The transport and scope preflight were replaced afterwards in e28d0cc and 369f9bb, so that result no longer speaks for current main; no lab SDC tenant was available to repeat it live. On 2026-10-06, against commit 2036523 with mecmcp v0.26.0, the automated integration suite was re-run instead — cargo test --workspace, 258 passed, 0 failed — which covers: requests with a missing bearer are refused (crates/rustsdcmcp/tests/httpboundary.rs::routerrequiresbearer), out-of-scope tenants are refused (crates/rustsdcmcp/tests/httpboundary.rs::outofscopetenantisrefused), exact tool and tenant scope enforcement with read/write tool disjointness (crates/rustsdcmcp/src/server.rs scope unit tests, crates/rustsdcmcp/tests/toolcontract.rs), and secret-key redaction of responses (crates/rustsdcmcp-core/src/redact.rs unit tests). The remaining properties from the 2026-08-07 live audit have not been re-verified on current main; this run is not a substitute for the live-tenant exercise and does not re-establish one.

Shortened. The full README is on GitHub.