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Portunus MCP server

by mdostal·io.github.mdostal/portunus·v0.34.0·2 stars

Secret broker for agents: reference secrets by name; values injected only at the execution boundary.

A88/100grade A
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Safety scan
A88/100

full report

Adoption
Growing

2 stars

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If you have run it, two minutes of your experience saves the next person an afternoon.

Portunus tools

No tool declarations could be read from the package source. They show once the server is installed.

Public scan report

scanner v0.1.10 · 2026-10-26 · same rubric, same numbers if you re-run it

no findings
  • –Code scanpackage could not be scannedn/a
  • –Live reliabilityno gateway calls yet and no remote to proben/a
  • –Tool poisoningtools not inspected (local package is not executed); not countedn/a
  • Auth qualitylocal package, no credentials required12/15
  • Maintenancelast push 5 days ago15/15
  • Maintainer identityregistry namespace matches repository owner; GitHub account older than a year8/10
Overall 88/100. Components that don't apply are left out of the denominator. Any critical finding is an F.RubricAppeal a findingJSON

How Portunus compares

Against every graded Security MCP server, from our own scans and uptime checks. Updated after each scan run.

Safety score
88/100
higher than 85% of 915 Security servers
GitHub stars
2
more than 75% of 587 Security servers

Install Portunus in Claude Code, Cursor or VS Code

claude mcp add portunus -- docker run -i --rm ghcr.io/mdostal/portunus:0.34.0
Add to Cursor

What the publisher says

From the Portunus repository's README, as published. We do not edit it. Read it on GitHub

Portunus

<!-- shared:tagline -->

A secret broker that finds secrets by metadata and injects them — without them ever touching your LLM. Free & open source.

<!-- /shared:tagline --> <!-- shared:byline --> Built by Mathew Dostal — fractional CTO, Dostal Technology. <!-- /shared:byline -->

Choose your vault. Give your AI agents safe tooling to use it — without secrets ever touching

the LLM.

portunus is a thin broker between your AI agents and the secret vault you already run. It doesn't store your secrets or reinvent vault security — it resolves them by metadata and injects them at the boundary, so an agent can use a secret (call an API, deploy, sign) without the raw value ever landing in the model's context, logs, or tool output.

(Portunus — the Roman god of keys and doors. Fitting.)

Get your agent using it in one command

curl -fsSL https://mdostal.github.io/portunus/install.sh | bash

Installs the CLI, wires the MCP server into whatever AI coding agent CLIs are already on the machine (Claude Code, Codex CLI today), and drops in the usage skills — so an agent gets the boundary-only usage conventions immediately, not just a raw tool list. Already have portunus installed? Just run portunus agent init — same thing, idempotent, safe to re-run any time (e.g. after installing a new harness). portunus agent status shows what's currently wired without changing anything.

Since this runs standalone often — a local key-value store on its own, not just a plugin — it keeps itself current too: portunus update check (read-only) / portunus update run (installs, with either an interactive confirm or --yes) walk the same "your own already-authenticated gh CLI, pinned to an exact release tag, never a silent unattended swap" posture as the desktop app's updater. A one-line stderr heads-up ("portunus vX.Y.Z is available…") shows up on its own, throttled to once a day, never installs anything by itself — opt out any time with PORTUNUSNOUPDATE_CHECK=1.

portunus site → — landing page, install snippets, and the component-model pitch in one place.

Documentation → — quickstart, concepts, architecture, CLI/MCP reference, and Process & Design, the design record behind every feature, published from .pHive/ and rebuilt on every push to main.

The problem

AI agents need real secrets to do real work — deploy tokens, API keys, DB creds. But the moment a secret touches an LLM's context, a log line, or a tool result, it's leaked. Most teams already have a vault. What's missing is the layer that lets an agent use that vault safely.

That's portunus.

What works today

Shortened. The full README is on GitHub.

Nothing above is checked by us. What we check is on the safety report.

Portunus: common questions

Is Portunus MCP server safe?
Yes, by our scan: it is graded A (88/100). Read the Portunus safety report
How do I install Portunus?
It runs on your machine. Copy the Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code or Claude Desktop config from the install section.
Does Portunus need an API key?
Not as far as the registry entry and our scan can tell: no credentials are declared or required.
Is Portunus maintained?
The last commit was 14 days ago (2026-10-21). The latest release is v0.34.0.
What can I use instead of Portunus?
Servers from other publishers that do the same job: Phantom Secrets MCP server, Skylos MCP server and MCP Safety Warden MCP server.
How does Portunus compare with other Security MCP servers?
safety score 88/100 (higher than 85% of 915 Security servers); github stars 2 (more than 75% of 587 Security servers). Full comparison.

Alternatives to Portunus

Same job from other publishers: the closest match first, then the best rated.

  • Phantom Secrets
    Value-blind secret metadata and gated workflows for AI coding agents through Phantom's local proxy.
    C
  • Skylos
    Dead code, security, secrets detection and code quality for Python, TypeScript, Go.
    C
  • MCP Safety Warden
    MCP proxy adding security scanning, behavioral profiling, risk gating, and safe tool call execution.
    A
  • chunk-invariance
    Checks whether your streaming redactor leaks a secret split across chunks; writes a pytest for it.
    A
  • SafeWeave
    Security scanner for AI-written code: SAST, secrets, dependencies, IaC, containers and DAST.
    C