Industrial-AIOps Energy MCP server

<!-- mcp-name: io.github.industrial-aiops/iaiops-energy -->

industrial-aiops-energy — Energy Edition (Substation / Utility)

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The energy edition of Industrial-AIOps, split out into its own repo: read-only OT connectors for substation / utility telecontrol protocols, built on top of iaiops.core.

• IEC 60870-5-104 (c104) — RTU / substation telemetry
• DNP3 / IEEE 1815 (pydnp3) — outstation monitoring
• IEC 61850 MMS (pyiec61850, linux-only wheel) — substation IED reads

It reuses the base package's shared governance (audit / budget / risk-tier / undo), cross-protocol brain (data-flow / alarm / OEE / downtime RCA on the normalized ISA-95/18.2 model), and MCP server infrastructure — this repo only adds the three energy connectors + their session builders + MCP tools. Read-first: no control-direction writes are exposed.

Current release: 0.1.11 (requires iaiops>=0.20.3,<1.0). New in 0.1.11 — all three monitor paths are CI-gated for the first time, and a skipped live test now fails the build instead of passing it. DNP3 was the holdout: pip install pydnp3 fails on any current Linux, so this repo inherited the ecosystem's "unbuildable on hosted runners" and tests/testdnp3live.py skipped on every build. It is not unbuildable — opendnp3 compiles clean, and the 2019 binding layer needed three mechanical fixes, now scripted in scripts/buildpydnp3.sh and running on real GitHub runners. Also inherits two governance fixes from iaiops 0.20.3 (pin raised): a call that failed is no longer audited as a success (which also mis-informed the pattern circuit breaker on every failure), and the runaway guard can now see a caller retrying a denial forever. Previously in 0.1.10 — a security fix inherited from the base package: three egress tools this edition mirrors (streampublish, streampublishevent, historianpush) wrote their credential — a NATS auth token, a TSDB password — into the audit log in the clear, and auditforward shipped that row to the configured SIEM. They are defined in iaiops, so this edition could not fix it alone; the pin moves to iaiops>=0.20.2, and a contract test now fails the build if the whole registered surface ever again carries an undeclared credential parameter. If you have passed a token or historian password to these tools, rotate it and check existing audit rows. The energy connectors themselves take no credential parameters. Previously in 0.1.9 — every tool ships the MCP ToolAnnotations hints (readOnlyHint / destructiveHint / openWorldHint), derived from the @governedtool harness rather than hand-written, so a client can tell a monitor read from a tool that acts without parsing the [READ]/[WRITE] docstring tag. On the wire that is 59 tools, 55 read-only and 0 destructive — this edition exposes no control direction, and that is now enforced by a test rather than only documented. They are hints, not a gate: the MCP spec forbids relying on annotations for security decisions, and enforcement stays in @governedtool. The base pin moved to iaiops>=0.20.1 so the hint derivation is imported from mcp_server.hints instead of duplicated here.

Shortened. The full README is on GitHub.