Context MCP server

Cortland 🍎

Your agent brings the brain. Cortland brings the hands — and the human gate.

Give an AI real access to your Mac — Mail, Calendar, Reminders, Notes, files — without giving it the keys. Every consequential action previews first, waits for your approval through a channel the model can't touch, gets logged, and can be undone.

Cortland has no model of its own, no cloud, and no web access. That is the point. Whatever agent you already use — Claude, Codex, Cursor, or a local Gemma that never leaves the machine — gets a governed way to touch your real data and to reach you.

A worked example

An agent watched a handful of retailer pages for days, waiting for a limited-run controller to come back in stock. When it finally did — unattended, at an hour I was nowhere near my desk — my phone buzzed with an iMessage. I bought one.

Cortland never touched a website. It has no web-fetch tool and never has. The watching was done by a coding agent with internet access. Cortland was the part that reached me: on my own Mac, through Messages, with the recipient fixed in local config so nothing the agent generated could point that message at anyone else.

That division is the pitch in one story. Your agent has the reasoning and the internet. Cortland has your Mac, your Apple apps, and your attention — and every outward action still stops to ask.

The part worth telling

The first version cheated, and I only found out by reading my own audit log.

No governed "tell the human" tool existed. The iMessage bridge could answer me, but nothing could start a conversation — so the monitor imported Cortland's send module directly and called it. It worked, and it was genuinely Cortland doing the sending: same owner handle from config, same AppleScript escaping, same hourly rate cap. But it went around the framework instead of through it, so days of running left zero audit rows.

That is this project failing its own test. A guarantee with no legitimate path through it is a guarantee people route around — and the person who routed around it was the one who wrote the guarantee.

The fix is notifyowner: write-safe, because a message to you is not an outward action, it is* the review loop. It has no recipient argument at all — the handle comes from local config, so no model output and no injected content can redirect it. Its hourly cap is counted from the audit log rather than from memory, so a cron job that starts fresh every run still can't exceed it. A notification now leaves a row behind. This one is real, copied out of the audit DB after sending a test message to my own phone:

notify_owner | Messages | write-safe | undo=none | dry_run=0 | ok
principal: cli:notify   tool_version: 0.2.0
args: {"text":{"redacted":true,"length":84,"sha256":"3e389e33…"},
       "source":"cortland-test"}

The body is stored as a length and a hash — the row proves a message was sent without keeping what it said. source stays readable because it is a label, constrained to a slug, and not content anyone can compose.

What it looks like in use

Text it like a contact — the bridge, answered by a 4 GB model on an 8 GB MacBook Air. Nothing left the Mac:

You:       Add a reminder to call the vet tomorrow at 2pm
Cortland: Received — working on it…
Cortland: Added "Call vet" for tomorrow, Aug 3 at 2:00 PM.

The texting interface needs a second Apple ID, signed into Messages on the Mac only — a mouthpiece, not a worker. It owns no mail, no calendar, no data. You text it from your phone like any contact; the Mac still does the work as you. Your system iCloud stays yours. Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, and other MCP clients skip this step: they talk to the same tools over stdio.

Ask about your week — reads are free, no approval needed:

Shortened. The full README is on GitHub.