macOS MCP Server
io.github.deploymenttheory/macos-mcp-server·v0.2.1Local macOS 27 desktop automation through MCP on Apple silicon.
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If you have run it, two minutes of your experience saves the next person an afternoon.
macOS MCP Server tools
No tool declarations could be read from the package source. They show once the server is installed.
Public scan report
scanner v0.1.10 · 2026-10-09 · same rubric, same numbers if you re-run it
- –Code scanpackage could not be scannedn/a
- –Live reliabilityno gateway calls yet and no remote to proben/a
- –Tool poisoningtools not inspected (local package is not executed); not countedn/a
- Auth qualitylocal package, no credentials required12/15
- Maintenancelast push 0 days ago15/15
- Maintainer identityregistry namespace matches repository owner; GitHub account older than a year9/10
How macOS MCP Server compares
Against every graded MCP server, from our own scans and uptime checks. Updated after each scan run.
- Safety score
- 90/100
- higher than 83% of 48,255 servers
Install macOS MCP Server in Claude Code, Cursor or VS Code
The registry entry has no remote endpoint or installable package.
What the publisher says
From the macOS MCP Server repository's README, as published. We do not edit it. Read it on GitHub
macos-mcp-server
A Model Context Protocol server that bridges AI agents to the macOS desktop: the accessibility tree, synthetic mouse and keyboard input, screenshots, window and application control, the shell, preferences, launchd, processes, the filesystem and web scraping. No computer-vision model is required: the agent perceives the UI through the accessibility tree, the way assistive technology does.
It is the macOS counterpart of windows-mcp-server: the same 35 tools, toolsets, personas, policy documents and journeys. What separates both from a plain automation bridge is that every agent action is gated on live device posture, the agent's network egress is constrained, and both are recorded in a tamper-evident audit chain the agent cannot switch off.
evaluated against live device signals (MDM enrolment, Platform SSO, boot security, FileVault, SIP, the sealed system volume) before it runs, and refused, warned or contained by policy. Rules match by tool, toolset or annotation, so a screenshot is not gated like a shell command. → Policy configuration
- Device policy engine: every tool call, resource read and prompt fetch is
optionally backed by pf rules so the console user, or the whole machine, cannot go around it. → Egress
- Egress allowlist: a loopback proxy admits only the domains you declare,
to the unified log), heartbeat, rug-pull detection, whole-session recording, evidence bundles and an out-of-band tiered kill switch. None of it is agent-disableable. → Security architecture
- Tamper-evident transparency: a hash-chained audit log (keyed, anchored
**Several tools (Shell, LaunchExecutable, Defaults, LaunchdJob, FileSystem,
Process, App) have full user-level system access with no sandboxing.** That
is the design. Run untrusted workloads in a guest, see
VM isolation, and read SECURITY.md
for what is and is not in scope as a vulnerability.
Requires macOS 27 or later on Apple silicon. Apple does not support Intel Macs on macOS 27.
Quick start
brew install deploymenttheory/tap/macos-mcp-server
macos-mcp-server permissions request # grant Accessibility and Screen Recording once
SERVER="$(command -v macos-mcp-server)"
codex mcp add macos -- "$SERVER" stdio --persona business-user
# Or, for Claude Code:
claude mcp add --scope user macos -- "$SERVER" stdio --persona business-userFor Claude Desktop, install the .mcpb from the latest GitHub release under Settings > Extensions > Advanced settings > Install Extension. It contains the signed server binary and requests the required macOS grants on first launch.
Any other local MCP client can launch the binary with the stdio subcommand:
{
"mcpServers": {
"macos": {
"command": "/absolute/path/from/command-v/macos-mcp-server",
"args": ["stdio", "--persona", "first-line-support"]
}
}
}→ Getting started covers Claude Code, Cursor, Codex CLI and Claude Desktop, and what to do before pointing this at a machine you care about. → Permissions explains the privacy grants and why the signing identity matters.
Shortened. The full README is on GitHub.
Nothing above is checked by us. What we check is on the safety report.
macOS MCP Server: common questions
- Is macOS MCP Server safe?
- Yes, by our scan: it is graded A (90/100). Read the macOS MCP Server safety report
- Does macOS MCP Server need an API key?
- Not as far as the registry entry and our scan can tell: no credentials are declared or required.
- Is macOS MCP Server maintained?
- The last commit was 26 days ago (2026-10-09). The latest release is v0.2.1.