Delego MCP server

delego

<!-- mcp-name: io.github.Delego-Dev/delego -->

Website: delegohq.com · Docs: delegohq.com/docs · Spec: Delego-Dev/specification

Intent-bound action authorization for AI agents. It sits between an agent and whatever credential broker holds the user's secrets, and it answers the one question brokers don't: is this specific action the thing the human actually asked for?

agent  ──propose──▶  delego  ──if allowed──▶  credential broker  ──▶  service
   (LLM)               (policy +                (Agent Vault /         (bank,
                        approval +               OneCLI /               SaaS,
                        audit)                   Browser Use…)          API)
                           │
                           └── needs_approval ──▶  human (CLI)

📜 Protocol: delego implements protocol 0.3 of the open delego wire specification — canonicalization, the policy schema, intent/fingerprint binding including the §4.2 query-fold, and the signed audit chain. The authorization token (spec §9) is an optional profile, not yet implemented.

Why this exists

The "agent gets its own scoped credential, and never holds the user's secret directly" pattern is now a crowded, converging space — Infisical's Agent Vault, OneCLI, Browser Use, Nango, and others all do credential brokering.

The harder problem sits one level up — the confused deputy: the agent holds a valid credential, a prompt injection redirects it, the scope covers the action, so the broker happily injects the secret and the action goes through. The credential is the wrong place to catch this — it's valid. OAuth tokens carry no commitment to the original instruction.

Authorising the action (not just the credential) is an active area — see deterministic policy engines (OPA/Cedar, Permit), human-in-the-loop approval (HumanLayer), MCP gateways/firewalls, and the "pre-action authorization" line of research. delego is a small, deterministic, local, Apache-2.0 reference for it: no LLM in the decision path, no credential custody, approvals bound to the exact action fingerprint, and a signed, hash-chained audit trail — riding the existing broker layer rather than competing with it.

What it is / isn't

sensitive actions, signed append-only audit ledger.

• Is a decision-and-audit layer. Deterministic policy, human approval for

through a thin BrokerAdapter interface — you ride the existing layer instead of rebuilding it.

• Isn't a credential vault or a proxy. It delegates execution to a broker

upstream; the decision that gates a credential is made outside the stochastic loop, so an injection can't talk its way past it.

• Authorisation is pure Python, no LLM in the loop. A model can advise

Key properties

Shortened. The full README is on GitHub.