Lucent MCP server
Call-scoped Clear Signing presentation checks for EVM signing agents.
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Lucent tools
No tool declarations could be read from the package source. They show once the server is installed.
Public scan report
scanner v0.1.9 · 2026-09-23 · same rubric, same numbers if you re-run it
- –Code scanpackage could not be scannedn/a
- –Live reliabilityno gateway calls yet and no remote to proben/a
- –Tool poisoningtools not inspected (local package is not executed); not countedn/a
- Auth qualitylocal package, no credentials required12/15
- Maintenancelast push 23 days ago15/15
- Maintainer identityregistry namespace matches repository owner; GitHub account older than a year8/10
How Lucent compares
Against every graded MCP server, from our own scans and uptime checks. Updated after each scan run.
- Safety score
- 88/100
- higher than 75% of 48,255 servers
Install Lucent in Claude Code, Cursor or VS Code
claude mcp add lucent -- docker run -i --rm ghcr.io/beepboop2025/lucent-mcp:v0.2.1
What the publisher says
From the Lucent repository's README, as published. We do not edit it. Read it on GitHub
Lucent
Tooling to author, verify, and attest ERC-7730 Clear Signing descriptors for the public registry that compatible wallets read from.
A descriptor is a JSON file that tells a wallet how to render a contract call in plain language, so users see what they are signing instead of raw hex. Lucent covers the full path: find contracts that lack a descriptor, write and harden one, check it beyond schema validity, prove it against real transactions, and produce an ERC-8176 attestation.
Hosted preflight API
Lucent's primary product surface is a call-scoped HTTP API with a stateless analysis core and bounded access/payment ledgers. It binds one unsigned EVM call (including sender) to one descriptor deployment, resolves the exact calldata selector, decodes the arguments, and runs the audit, comprehension, and danger checks only for that selected function:
make setup
make api
curl http://127.0.0.1:8780/health
open http://127.0.0.1:8780/docsPOST /v1/preflight returns call and assessment fingerprints with a safetopresent, review, or block decision. A blocked call is a successful assessment and therefore returns HTTP 200; malformed, unbound, ambiguous, or undecodable input returns a stable application/problem+json error.
The words are intentional: safetopresent never means safe to execute. Version 1 uses a deliberately narrow scalar presentation profile. Local mode can analyze caller-supplied ABI data; protected deployments can instead require a finalized runtime-bytecode match and Sourcify ABI before a verdict is returned. Hosted V1 rejects proxy-backed deployments until dispatch and upgrade-state semantics can be proven, including custom delegatecall dispatchers without EIP-1967 slots. Neither mode simulates state, detects economic exploits, or judges the counterparty. Those limits ride in every response. Full contract and deployment modes: docs/HOSTED-API.md.
Protected access and Base-USDC payments
The API and container start disabled. make api opts into loopback-only local development (open, verified source off, x402 off). Production modes are configured explicitly at startup and fail closed when their dependencies are incoherent:
idempotent result replay;
- api_key — hashed tenant keys, per-tenant token buckets, and five-minute
settlement on Base mainnet;
- x402 — official x402 v2 challenge/signature/receipt headers and exact USDC
pay-per-request fallback.
- apikeyor_x402 — subscription/quota access for integrations, with USDC
Any mode that accepts x402 requires verified-source mode. Payment proofs are verified before Lucent uses RPC/Sourcify capacity, settled only after a complete result exists. Exact retries replay the retained receipt, while a separate authorization ledger prevents the same signed EIP-3009 transfer from being rewrapped under a new idempotency key. Paid outcomes are not evicted while unexpired, and authorizations must expire within the server-owned five-minute window. The container runs one worker by default; scale-out requires a shared quota/idempotency/authorization-claim backend.
For signing agents: the MCP server
An AI agent about to sign a transaction faces exactly the question Lucent's checks answer — is this call clear enough to present, and does the screen a human would see actually describe what it does? scripts/mcp_server.py exposes that as an MCP server (JSON-RPC over stdio) so an agent can pre-flight a signature:
Shortened. The full README is on GitHub.
Nothing above is checked by us. What we check is on the safety report.
Lucent: common questions
- Is Lucent MCP server safe?
- Yes, by our scan: it is graded A (88/100). Read the Lucent safety report
- How do I install Lucent?
- It runs on your machine. Copy the Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code or Claude Desktop config from the install section.
- Does Lucent need an API key?
- Not as far as the registry entry and our scan can tell: no credentials are declared or required.
- Is Lucent maintained?
- The last commit was 65 days ago (2026-08-31). The latest release is v0.2.1.