building-super-timelines-with-plaso skill
Generate forensic super-timelines with Plaso's log2timeline.py, pinfo.py,
Is the building-super-timelines-with-plaso skill safe?
Clean: nothing in its files matched our rules. We read 5 files in the folder on 2026-09-28.
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Install the building-super-timelines-with-plaso skill
A skill is a folder. Copy it into your agent's skills folder and the agent loads it when the task matches its description.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git /tmp/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills cp -r /tmp/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/building-super-timelines-with-plaso ~/.claude/skills/building-super-timelines-with-plaso
In the Claude apps, zip the folder and upload it from the Skills settings. The folder on GitHub
The instructions your agent would load
SKILL.md as published, without the frontmatter. Read it on GitHub
Building Super Timelines with Plaso
Authorized Use Only: Build timelines only from evidence you are authorized to analyze. Work from forensic images/copies and preserve chain of custody.
Overview
Plaso (Plaso Langar Að Safna Öllu) is the open-source engine behind log2timeline, the standard for building forensic super timelines — a single chronological, normalized view fusing hundreds of artifact types (file-system MACB times, registry, EVTX, browser history, prefetch, LNK, $UsnJrnl, syslog, and more) into one timeline. Plaso has three core CLI tools:
- log2timeline.py — extracts events from a source (disk image, mount point, directory, or device) into a .plaso storage file using its large parser/plugin set.
- pinfo.py — reports on the contents and processing metadata of a .plaso file.
- psort.py — post-processes, filters, deduplicates, time-zones, and exports the storage file to an output format (CSV, JSON-line, Elasticsearch, Timesketch, etc.).
- psteal.py — convenience wrapper that runs extraction + export in one step.
The resulting timeline is enormous, so analysts triage it in Timesketch — a collaborative, web-based timeline analysis platform that ingests .plaso files (or CSV/JSONL) and supports filtering, tagging, starring, saved searches, and automated analyzers.
When to Use
- Reconstructing the full sequence of events on a compromised host during incident response.
- Correlating activity across many artifact sources on a single normalized timeline.
- Investigating anti-forensic behavior such as timestomping or log clearing (which stands out against MACB and journal evidence).
- Feeding a curated timeline into Timesketch for team triage.
Prerequisites
- Install Plaso (Docker is the supported, reproducible method):
docker pull log2timeline/plaso
# Run a tool, mounting your evidence/output directory
docker run -v /cases:/data log2timeline/plaso log2timeline.py --versionAlternatively on Ubuntu via the GIFT PPA:
sudo add-apt-repository ppa:gift/stable
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y plaso-tools- A Timesketch instance (docker-compose deployment from https://github.com/google/timesketch) for triage.
- A forensic image (E01/raw) or mounted file system.
Objectives
- Extract events from an image into a .plaso storage file.
- Inspect the storage file with pinfo.
- Filter and export a focused super timeline with psort.
- Import the timeline into Timesketch and triage it.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Plaso is a defensive forensics engine; the mapping reflects the anti-forensic adversary behavior super timelines are well suited to detect.
Workflow
1. Extract events into a storage file
log2timeline.py writes a .plaso file from a source. --storage-file names the output; the source can be an .E01, raw image, mount point, or directory.
log2timeline.py --storage-file timeline.plaso /cases/greendale/image.E01Scope parsers for speed/relevance with --parsers (presets like win7, webhist, or explicit parser names):
log2timeline.py --parsers "win7,!filestat" --storage-file timeline.plaso /cases/image.E012. Inspect the storage file
pinfo.py reports source, parsers used, event counts, and any warnings.
pinfo.py timeline.plaso3. Export a filtered super timeline (CSV)
psort.py selects an output module with -o, writes with -w, normalizes the timezone with --output-time-zone, and accepts an event filter expression to scope a date range.
psort.py --output-time-zone 'UTC' \
-o l2tcsv \
-w supertimeline.csv \
timeline.plaso \
"date > datetime('2026-01-01T00:00:00') AND date < datetime('2026-01-27T00:00:00')"For Timesketch-friendly JSON lines, use the json_line output module:
psort.py --output-time-zone 'UTC' -o json_line -w supertimeline.jsonl timeline.plaso4. One-step extraction + export with psteal
psteal.py runs extraction and CSV export together for quick triage.
psteal.py --source /cases/greendale/image.E01 -o l2tcsv -w supertimeline.csv5. Import into Timesketch
Use the official timesketch_importer CLI to upload the .plaso (or CSV/JSONL) into a sketch. Timesketch chunks/reassembles and indexes the file.
timesketch_importer \
--host http://127.0.0.1:5000 \
--username admin \
--timeline_name "greendale-host01" \
--sketch_id 1 \
timeline.plaso6. Triage in Timesketch
In the sketch UI:
- Filter to a suspicious window or data_type (e.g. windows:evtx:record, fs:stat).
- Star/tag events of interest and add comments for collaboration.
- Save searches and run analyzers (e.g. browser timeframe, similarity, sigma) over the timeline.
- Build a narrative from corroborating events across artifact sources.
7. Hunt for anti-forensics
Look for MACB timestamps that disagree with $UsnJrnl entries (timestomping), gaps or EventLog cleared (1102) records, and deleted-then-recreated files — all visible on the unified timeline.
Tools and Resources
Key Commands
Validation Criteria
- [ ] .plaso storage file produced from the source image
- [ ] pinfo confirms expected parsers ran and event counts are non-zero
- [ ] Super timeline exported with UTC normalization and a scoped filter
- [ ] Timeline imported into a Timesketch sketch and indexed
- [ ] Suspicious window triaged with tags/stars/saved searches
- [ ] Anti-forensic indicators (timestomping, log clearing) checked
- [ ] Findings documented with corroborating cross-source events
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