Mmcp.market

building-detection-rules-with-sigma skill

by mukul975·mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills·34k stars·Apache-2.0

'Builds vendor-agnostic detection rules using the Sigma rule format for

A100/100content scan

Is the building-detection-rules-with-sigma skill safe?

Clean: nothing in its files matched our rules. We read 4 files in the folder on 2026-09-28.

No findings.

Install the building-detection-rules-with-sigma skill

A skill is a folder. Copy it into your agent's skills folder and the agent loads it when the task matches its description.

git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git /tmp/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills
cp -r /tmp/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/building-detection-rules-with-sigma ~/.claude/skills/building-detection-rules-with-sigma
available in every project

In the Claude apps, zip the folder and upload it from the Skills settings. The folder on GitHub

The instructions your agent would load

SKILL.md as published, without the frontmatter. Read it on GitHub

Building Detection Rules with Sigma

When to Use

Use this skill when:

  • SOC engineers need to create detection rules portable across multiple SIEM platforms
  • Threat intelligence reports describe TTPs requiring new detection coverage
  • Existing vendor-specific rules need standardization into a shareable format
  • The team adopts Sigma as a detection-as-code standard in CI/CD pipelines

Do not use for real-time streaming detection (Sigma is for batch/scheduled searches) or when the target SIEM has native detection features that Sigma cannot express (e.g., Splunk RBA risk scoring).

Prerequisites

  • Python 3.8+ with pySigma and appropriate backend (pySigma-backend-splunk, pySigma-backend-elasticsearch, pySigma-backend-microsoft365defender)
  • Sigma rule repository cloned: git clone https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma.git
  • MITRE ATT&CK framework knowledge for technique mapping
  • Understanding of target SIEM log source field mappings

Workflow

Step 1: Define Detection Logic from Threat Intelligence

Start with a threat report or ATT&CK technique. Example: detecting Mimikatz credential dumping (T1003.001 — LSASS Memory):

title: Mimikatz Credential Dumping via LSASS Access
id: 0d894093-71bc-43c3-8d63-bf520e73a7c5
status: stable
level: high
description: Detects process accessing lsass.exe memory, indicative of credential dumping tools like Mimikatz
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
    - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
author: mahipal
date: 2024/03/15
modified: 2024/03/15
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        GrantedAccess|contains:
            - '0x1010'
            - '0x1038'
            - '0x1fffff'
            - '0x40'
    filter_main_svchost:
        SourceImage|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_csrss:
        SourceImage|endswith: '\csrss.exe'
    filter_main_wininit:
        SourceImage|endswith: '\wininit.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate security tools accessing LSASS
    - Windows Defender scanning
    - CrowdStrike Falcon sensor

Step 2: Validate Sigma Rule Syntax

Use sigma check to validate the rule:

# Install pySigma and validators
pip install pySigma pySigma-validators-sigmaHQ

# Validate rule
sigma check rule.yml

Alternatively, validate with Python:

from sigma.rule import SigmaRule
from sigma.validators.core import SigmaValidator

rule = SigmaRule.from_yaml(open("rule.yml").read())
validator = SigmaValidator()
issues = validator.validate_rule(rule)
for issue in issues:
    print(f"{issue.severity}: {issue.message}")

Step 3: Convert to Target SIEM Query

Convert to Splunk SPL:

from sigma.rule import SigmaRule
from sigma.backends.splunk import SplunkBackend
from sigma.pipelines.splunk import splunk_windows_pipeline

pipeline = splunk_windows_pipeline()
backend = SplunkBackend(pipeline)

rule = SigmaRule.from_yaml(open("rule.yml").read())
splunk_query = backend.convert_rule(rule)
print(splunk_query[0])

Output:

TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe" (GrantedAccess="*0x1010*" OR GrantedAccess="*0x1038*"
OR GrantedAccess="*0x1fffff*" OR GrantedAccess="*0x40*")
NOT (SourceImage="*\\svchost.exe") NOT (SourceImage="*\\csrss.exe")
NOT (SourceImage="*\\wininit.exe")

Convert to Elastic Query (Lucene):

from sigma.backends.elasticsearch import LuceneBackend
from sigma.pipelines.elasticsearch import ecs_windows_pipeline

pipeline = ecs_windows_pipeline()
backend = LuceneBackend(pipeline)
elastic_query = backend.convert_rule(rule)
print(elastic_query[0])

Convert to Microsoft Sentinel KQL:

from sigma.backends.microsoft365defender import Microsoft365DefenderBackend

backend = Microsoft365DefenderBackend()
kql_query = backend.convert_rule(rule)
print(kql_query[0])

Step 4: Map to MITRE ATT&CK and Add Coverage Metadata

Tag every rule with ATT&CK technique IDs in the tags field:

tags:
    - attack.credential_access        # Tactic
    - attack.t1003.001                # Sub-technique
    - attack.t1003                    # Parent technique

Track detection coverage using the ATT&CK Navigator:

import json

# Generate ATT&CK Navigator layer from Sigma rules
layer = {
    "name": "SOC Detection Coverage",
    "versions": {"attack": "14", "navigator": "4.9", "layer": "4.5"},
    "domain": "enterprise-attack",
    "techniques": []
}

# Parse Sigma rules directory for technique tags
import os
from sigma.rule import SigmaRule

for root, dirs, files in os.walk("sigma/rules/windows/"):
    for f in files:
        if f.endswith(".yml"):
            rule = SigmaRule.from_yaml(open(os.path.join(root, f)).read())
            for tag in rule.tags:
                if str(tag).startswith("attack.t"):
                    technique_id = str(tag).replace("attack.", "").upper()
                    layer["techniques"].append({
                        "techniqueID": technique_id,
                        "color": "#31a354",
                        "score": 1
                    })

with open("coverage_layer.json", "w") as f:
    json.dump(layer, f, indent=2)

Step 5: Test Rule Against Sample Data

Create test data and validate the rule catches the expected events:

# Use sigma test framework
sigma test rule.yml --target splunk --pipeline splunk_windows

# Or manually test in Splunk with sample data
# Upload Sysmon process_access log with known Mimikatz signature

Validate false positive rate by running against 7 days of production data in a non-alerting saved search.

Step 6: Deploy to Production SIEM

Deploy the converted query as a scheduled search or correlation rule:

Splunk ES Correlation Search:

| tstats summariesonly=true count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  where Processes.process_name="*\\lsass.exe"
  by Processes.src, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| where count > 0

Elastic Security Rule (TOML format):

[rule]
name = "LSASS Memory Access - Credential Dumping"
description = "Detects suspicious access to LSASS process memory"
risk_score = 73
severity = "high"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where event.action == "access" and
  process.name == "lsass.exe" and
  not process.executable : ("*\\svchost.exe", "*\\csrss.exe")
'''

[rule.threat]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1003"
name = "OS Credential Dumping"

Step 7: Version Control and CI/CD Integration

Store rules in Git with automated testing:

# .github/workflows/sigma-ci.yml
name: Sigma Rule CI
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
  validate:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
        with:
          python-version: '3.11'
      - run: pip install pySigma pySigma-validators-sigmaHQ
      - run: sigma check rules/
      - run: sigma convert -t splunk -p splunk_windows rules/ > /dev/null

Key Concepts

Tools & Systems

  • SigmaHQ: Official Sigma rule repository with 3,000+ community-maintained detection rules on GitHub
  • pySigma: Python-based Sigma rule processing framework with modular backends and pipelines
  • ATT&CK Navigator: MITRE tool for visualizing detection coverage mapped to ATT&CK techniques
  • Uncoder.IO: Web-based Sigma rule converter supporting 30+ SIEM platforms for quick translation

Common Scenarios

  • New CVE Detection: Write Sigma rule for exploitation indicators (e.g., Log4Shell JNDI lookup patterns in web logs)
  • Hunting Rule Promotion: Convert ad-hoc Splunk hunting query into Sigma rule for ongoing automated detection
  • Multi-SIEM Migration: Converting 500+ Splunk correlation searches to Sigma for migration to Elastic Security
  • Purple Team Output: Convert red team findings into Sigma rules for immediate defensive coverage
  • Threat Intel Operationalization: Transform IOC-based threat reports into behavioral Sigma rules

Output Format

SIGMA RULE DEPLOYMENT REPORT
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Rule ID:      0d894093-71bc-43c3-8d63-bf520e73a7c5
Title:        Mimikatz Credential Dumping via LSASS Access
ATT&CK:       T1003.001 - LSASS Memory
Severity:     High
Status:       Deployed to Production

Conversions:
  Splunk SPL:    PASS — Saved search "sigma_lsass_access" created
  Elastic EQL:   PASS — Detection rule ID elastic-0d894093 enabled
  Sentinel KQL:  PASS — Analytics rule deployed via ARM template

Testing:
  True Positives:    4/4 test cases matched
  False Positives:   2 in 7-day backtest (svchost edge case — filter added)
  Performance:       Avg execution 3.2s on 50M events/day

More skills from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

  • Aabusing-dpapi-for-credential-accessExtract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys) online or offline using SharpDPAPI, SharpChrome, Mimikatz, or Impacket's dpapi.py, including domain-wide decryption via the DPAPI backup key. Use during authorized red-team credential-access engagements after gaining a foothold or when triaging DPAPI blobs pulled from a host.
  • Aabusing-shadow-credentials-for-privescTake over Active Directory accounts by writing attacker-controlled public keys to msDS-KeyCredentialLink (Shadow Credentials) with pyWhisker, Whisker, or Certipy, then authenticate via PKINIT to recover the target's NT hash without a password reset. Use when BloodHound shows GenericWrite/GenericAll/AddKeyCredentialLink over a target, as a stealthier alternative to ForceChangePassword, during authorized red-team engagements.
  • Aachieving-cmmc-level-2-compliancePrepare a defense-contractor environment for CMMC Level 2 certification: scope CUI and FCI, implement the 110 NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 security requirements across 14 families, compute the SPRS score with the DoD Assessment Methodology, manage a compliant POA&M, and ready the organization for a C3PAO assessment. Use when an organization handles Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) under a DoD contract, when a contract carries DFARS clause 252.204-7012/7019/7020/7021, when preparing for or responding to a CMMC assessment, when computing or improving an SPRS score, when building a System Security Plan or POA&M for 800-171, or when scoping which systems are in the CUI boundary. Keywords: CMMC, CMMC Level 2, NIST 800-171, SP 800-171 Rev 2, CUI, FCI, SPRS, DFARS 7012, C3PAO, POA&M, System Security Plan, DoD Assessment Methodology, 110 controls, defense industrial base, DIB, FedRAMP equivalency.
  • Aacquiring-disk-image-with-dd-and-dcflddCreate forensically sound bit-for-bit disk images with dd or dcfldd on a Linux forensic workstation, preserving evidence integrity through hash verification (MD5/SHA) during acquisition. Use when imaging a suspect drive, USB device, or memory card for investigation, preserving volatile disk evidence during incident response, or producing a verified copy for legal or law-enforcement proceedings before any destructive analysis.
  • Aanalyzing-active-directory-acl-abuseDetect dangerous ACL misconfigurations in Active Directory using ldap3
  • Aanalyzing-android-malware-with-apktoolPerform static analysis of Android APK malware using apktool for resource decompilation, jadx for Java source recovery, and androguard for manifest inspection, dangerous permission-combination detection, and identification of obfuscated code, dynamic code loading, and reflection-based API calls. Use to statically triage a suspicious APK without executing it or to build mobile malware detection rules.
  • Danalyzing-api-gateway-access-logs'Parses API Gateway access logs (AWS API Gateway, Kong, Nginx) to detect
  • Aanalyzing-apt-group-with-mitre-navigatorQuery ATT&CK data with attackcti, mitreattack-python, and stix2, then build MITRE ATT&CK Navigator layers and multi-layer heatmap overlays mapping one or more APT groups' TTPs for detection-gap analysis. Use to compare threat-actor technique coverage, find gaps in detection engineering, or produce Navigator visualizations for threat-intel reporting.
  • Aanalyzing-azure-activity-logs-for-threats'Queries Azure Monitor activity logs and sign-in logs via azure-monitor-query
  • Aanalyzing-bootkit-and-rootkit-samples'Analyzes bootkit and advanced rootkit malware infecting the Master
  • Aanalyzing-browser-forensics-with-hindsightParse Chromium-based browser databases with Hindsight to extract and correlate browsing history, downloads, cookies, cached content, autofill data, saved passwords, and extensions from Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera, and Vivaldi into a unified timeline (XLSX, JSON, or SQLite output). Use during incident response, insider-threat investigations, or criminal cases when you need to reconstruct a user's web activity from a browser profile.
  • Aanalyzing-campaign-attribution-evidenceSystematically evaluate cyber-campaign evidence to attribute an operation to a threat actor, using the Diamond Model and Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) to weigh infrastructure overlaps, TTP consistency, malware code similarity, and timing/language artifacts into confidence-weighted attribution assessments. Use when an incident investigation needs a defensible attribution confidence level.

All agent skills → · MCP servers