building-automated-malware-submission-pipeline skill
'Builds an automated malware submission and analysis pipeline that collects
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Install the building-automated-malware-submission-pipeline skill
A skill is a folder. Copy it into your agent's skills folder and the agent loads it when the task matches its description.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git /tmp/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills cp -r /tmp/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/building-automated-malware-submission-pipeline ~/.claude/skills/building-automated-malware-submission-pipeline
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In the Claude apps, zip the folder and upload it from the Skills settings. The folder on GitHub
The instructions your agent would load
SKILL.md as published, without the frontmatter. Read it on GitHub
Building Automated Malware Submission Pipeline
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- SOC teams face high volume of suspicious file alerts requiring sandbox analysis
- Manual sandbox submission creates bottlenecks in alert triage workflow
- Endpoint and email security tools quarantine files needing automated verdict determination
- Incident response requires rapid malware family identification and IOC extraction
Do not use for analyzing live malware samples in production environments — always use isolated sandbox infrastructure.
Prerequisites
- Sandbox environment: Cuckoo Sandbox, Joe Sandbox, Any.Run, or VMRay
- VirusTotal API key (Enterprise for submission, free for lookup)
- MalwareBazaar API access for known malware lookup
- File collection mechanism: EDR quarantine API, email gateway export, network capture
- Python 3.8+ with requests, vt-py, pefile libraries
- Isolated analysis network with no production connectivity
Workflow
Step 1: Build File Collection Pipeline
Collect suspicious files from multiple sources:
import requests
import hashlib
import os
from pathlib import Path
from datetime import datetime
class MalwareCollector:
def __init__(self, quarantine_dir="/opt/malware_quarantine"):
self.quarantine_dir = Path(quarantine_dir)
self.quarantine_dir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
def collect_from_edr(self, edr_api_url, api_token):
"""Pull quarantined files from CrowdStrike Falcon"""
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {api_token}"}
# Get recent quarantine events
response = requests.get(
f"{edr_api_url}/quarantine/queries/quarantined-files/v1",
headers=headers,
params={"filter": "state:'quarantined'", "limit": 50}
)
file_ids = response.json()["resources"]
for file_id in file_ids:
# Download quarantined file
dl_response = requests.get(
f"{edr_api_url}/quarantine/entities/quarantined-files/v1",
headers=headers,
params={"ids": file_id}
)
file_data = dl_response.content
sha256 = hashlib.sha256(file_data).hexdigest()
filepath = self.quarantine_dir / f"{sha256}.sampStep 2: Pre-Screen with Hash Lookups
Check if the file is already known before sandbox submission:
import vt
class MalwarePreScreener:
def __init__(self, vt_api_key, mb_api_url="https://mb-api.abuse.ch/api/v1/"):
self.vt_client = vt.Client(vt_api_key)
self.mb_api_url = mb_api_url
def check_virustotal(self, sha256):
"""Lookup hash in VirusTotal"""
try:
file_obj = self.vt_client.get_object(f"/files/{sha256}")
stats = file_obj.last_analysis_stats
return {
"found": True,
"malicious": stats.get("malicious", 0),
"suspicious": stats.get("suspicious", 0),
"undetected": stats.get("undetected", 0),
"total": sum(stats.values()),
"threat_label": getattr(file_obj, "popular_threat_classification", {}).get(
"suggested_threat_label", "Unknown"
),
"type": getattr(file_obj, "type_description", "Unknown")
}
except vt.APIError:
return {"found": False}
def check_malwarebazaar(self, sha256):
"""Lookup hash in MalwareBazaar"""
response = requests.post(
self.mb_api_url,
data={"query": "get_info", "hash": Step 3: Submit to Sandbox for Dynamic Analysis
Cuckoo Sandbox Submission:
class SandboxSubmitter:
def __init__(self, cuckoo_url="http://cuckoo.internal:8090"):
self.cuckoo_url = cuckoo_url
def submit_to_cuckoo(self, filepath, timeout=300):
"""Submit file to Cuckoo Sandbox"""
with open(filepath, "rb") as f:
response = requests.post(
f"{self.cuckoo_url}/tasks/create/file",
files={"file": f},
data={
"timeout": timeout,
"options": "procmemdump=yes,route=none",
"priority": 2,
"machine": "win10_x64"
}
)
task_id = response.json()["task_id"]
return task_id
def wait_for_analysis(self, task_id, poll_interval=30, max_wait=600):
"""Wait for sandbox analysis to complete"""
import time
elapsed = 0
while elapsed < max_wait:
response = requests.get(f"{self.cuckoo_url}/tasks/view/{task_id}")
status = response.json()["task"]["status"]
if status == "reported":
return self.get_report(task_id)
elif status == "failed_analysis":
return {"error": "AnStep 4: Extract IOCs and Generate Verdict
class VerdictGenerator:
def __init__(self):
self.malicious_threshold = 7 # Cuckoo score threshold
def generate_verdict(self, pre_screen, sandbox_report):
"""Combine pre-screening and sandbox results for final verdict"""
iocs = {
"ips": [],
"domains": [],
"urls": [],
"hashes": [],
"registry_keys": [],
"files_dropped": []
}
# Extract IOCs from sandbox report
if sandbox_report:
iocs["domains"] = sandbox_report.get("network", {}).get("dns", [])
iocs["ips"] = sandbox_report.get("network", {}).get("hosts", [])
iocs["urls"] = [
h["url"] for h in sandbox_report.get("network", {}).get("http", [])
]
iocs["hashes"] = [
f["sha256"] for f in sandbox_report.get("dropped_files", [])
]
iocs["registry_keys"] = sandbox_report.get("registry_keys", [])[:10]
iocs["files_dropped"] = sandbox_report.get("dropped_files", [])
# Determine verdict
vt_malicious = pre_screen.get("virustotal", {}).get("malicious", 0)
sandbox_score = Step 5: Push Results to SIEM
def push_to_splunk(verdict_result, splunk_url, splunk_token):
"""Send malware analysis verdict to Splunk HEC"""
import json
event = {
"sourcetype": "malware_analysis",
"source": "malware_pipeline",
"event": {
"sha256": verdict_result["sha256"],
"verdict": verdict_result["verdict"],
"confidence": verdict_result["confidence"],
"score": verdict_result["combined_score"],
"vt_detections": verdict_result["vt_detections"],
"sandbox_score": verdict_result["sandbox_score"],
"malware_family": verdict_result.get("threat_label", "Unknown"),
"iocs": verdict_result["iocs"],
"signatures": [s["name"] for s in verdict_result["signatures"]]
}
}
response = requests.post(
f"{splunk_url}/services/collector/event",
headers={
"Authorization": f"Splunk {splunk_token}",
"Content-Type": "application/json"
},
json=event,
verify=not os.environ.get("SKIP_TLS_VERIFY", "").lower() == "true", # Set SKIP_TLS_VERIFY=true for self-signed certs in lab environments
)
return response.statStep 6: Orchestrate the Full Pipeline
def run_malware_pipeline(sample_path, config):
"""Execute full malware analysis pipeline"""
collector = MalwareCollector()
screener = MalwarePreScreener(config["vt_key"])
submitter = SandboxSubmitter(config["cuckoo_url"])
generator = VerdictGenerator()
# Step 1: Hash and pre-screen
hashes = collector.compute_hashes(sample_path)
pre_screen = screener.pre_screen(hashes["sha256"])
# Step 2: Submit to sandbox if unknown
sandbox_report = None
if pre_screen["needs_sandbox"]:
task_id = submitter.submit_to_cuckoo(sample_path)
sandbox_report = submitter.wait_for_analysis(task_id)
# Step 3: Generate verdict
verdict = generator.generate_verdict(pre_screen, sandbox_report)
verdict["sha256"] = hashes["sha256"]
verdict["threat_label"] = pre_screen.get("virustotal", {}).get("threat_label", "Unknown")
# Step 4: Push to SIEM
push_to_splunk(verdict, config["splunk_url"], config["splunk_token"])
# Step 5: Block if malicious
if verdict["verdict"] == "MALICIOUS":
push_iocs_to_blocklist(verdict["iocs"], config["firewall_api"])
screener.close()
return verdictKey Concepts
Tools & Systems
- Cuckoo Sandbox: Open-source automated malware analysis platform with behavioral analysis and network capture
- Joe Sandbox: Commercial sandbox with deep behavioral analysis, YARA matching, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping
- Any.Run: Interactive sandbox service allowing real-time manipulation during analysis for debugging evasive malware
- VirusTotal: Multi-engine scanning service providing 70+ AV results and behavioral analysis reports
- CAPE Sandbox: Community-maintained Cuckoo fork with enhanced payload extraction and configuration dumping
Common Scenarios
- Email Attachment Triage: Auto-submit quarantined email attachments, generate verdict in <5 minutes
- EDR Quarantine Processing: Batch-process files quarantined by endpoint security for detailed analysis
- Incident Investigation: Submit suspicious binaries found during IR for malware family identification and IOC extraction
- Threat Intel Enrichment: Analyze samples from threat feeds to extract C2 infrastructure and update blocking
- Zero-Day Detection: Sandbox catches novel malware missed by signature-based AV through behavioral analysis
Output Format
MALWARE ANALYSIS REPORT — Pipeline Submission
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Sample: invoice_march.docx
SHA256: a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8...
File Type: Microsoft Word Document (macro-enabled)
Pre-Screening:
VirusTotal: 34/72 malicious (Emotet.Downloader)
MalwareBazaar: Tags: emotet, macro, downloader
Sandbox Analysis (Cuckoo):
Score: 9.2/10 (MALICIOUS)
Signatures:
- Macro executes PowerShell download cradle (severity: 8)
- Process injection into explorer.exe (severity: 9)
- Connects to known Emotet C2 server (severity: 9)
Extracted IOCs:
C2 IPs: 185.234.218[.]50:8080, 45.77.123[.]45:443
Domains: update-service[.]evil[.]com
Dropped Files: payload.dll (SHA256: b2c3d4e5...)
Registry: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Update
VERDICT: MALICIOUS (Emotet Downloader) — Confidence: HIGH
ACTIONS:
[DONE] IOCs pushed to Splunk threat intel
[DONE] C2 IPs blocked on firewall
[DONE] Domain sinkholed on DNS
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