auditing-terraform-infrastructure-for-security skill
'Auditing Terraform infrastructure-as-code for security misconfigurations
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Install the auditing-terraform-infrastructure-for-security skill
A skill is a folder. Copy it into your agent's skills folder and the agent loads it when the task matches its description.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git /tmp/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills cp -r /tmp/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/auditing-terraform-infrastructure-for-security ~/.claude/skills/auditing-terraform-infrastructure-for-security
In the Claude apps, zip the folder and upload it from the Skills settings. The folder on GitHub
The instructions your agent would load
SKILL.md as published, without the frontmatter. Read it on GitHub
Auditing Terraform Infrastructure for Security
When to Use
- When integrating security scanning into CI/CD pipelines for Terraform deployments
- When reviewing Terraform plans and modules for security best practices before applying
- When building policy-as-code guardrails for cloud infrastructure provisioning
- When auditing existing Terraform state files to identify deployed misconfigurations
- When enforcing organizational security standards across multiple Terraform projects
Do not use for runtime security monitoring (use CSPM tools), for application security testing (use SAST/DAST tools), or for cloud configuration drift detection (use AWS Config or Azure Policy after deployment).
Prerequisites
- Checkov installed (pip install checkov)
- tfsec installed (brew install tfsec or binary from GitHub)
- Terrascan installed (brew install terrascan)
- Terraform v1.0+ for plan generation
- OPA (Open Policy Agent) for custom policy enforcement
- Git repository with Terraform code to audit
Workflow
Step 1: Scan Terraform Code with Checkov
Run Checkov for comprehensive IaC security scanning with built-in and custom policies.
# Scan a Terraform directory
checkov -d ./terraform/ --framework terraform
# Scan with specific check categories
checkov -d ./terraform/ --check CKV_AWS_18,CKV_AWS_19,CKV_AWS_20,CKV_AWS_21
# Scan and output results in JSON
checkov -d ./terraform/ --output json > checkov-results.json
# Scan a Terraform plan file for more accurate analysis
terraform init && terraform plan -out=tfplan
terraform show -json tfplan > tfplan.json
checkov -f tfplan.json --framework terraform_plan
# Skip specific checks with justification
checkov -d ./terraform/ --skip-check CKV_AWS_145 \
--bc-api-key $BRIDGECREW_API_KEY
# Scan Terraform modules
checkov -d ./modules/ --framework terraform --compact
# List all available checks
checkov --list --framework terraform | grep CKV_AWSStep 2: Scan with tfsec for Terraform-Specific Issues
Use tfsec for Terraform-native security analysis with detailed remediation guidance.
# Scan a Terraform directory
tfsec ./terraform/
# Scan with minimum severity threshold
tfsec ./terraform/ --minimum-severity HIGH
# Output in JSON for CI/CD processing
tfsec ./terraform/ --format json > tfsec-results.json
# Scan with custom checks
tfsec ./terraform/ --custom-check-dir ./custom-checks/
# Exclude specific rules
tfsec ./terraform/ --exclude-downloaded-modules \
--exclude aws-s3-enable-bucket-logging
# Scan and fail on specific severity
tfsec ./terraform/ --minimum-severity CRITICAL --soft-fail
# Generate SARIF output for GitHub Security tab
tfsec ./terraform/ --format sarif > tfsec.sarifStep 3: Run Terrascan for Multi-Framework Compliance
Execute Terrascan for compliance checking against CIS, NIST, and SOC 2 frameworks.
# Scan Terraform against CIS AWS benchmark
terrascan scan -t aws -i terraform -d ./terraform/ \
--policy-type aws --verbose
# Scan against specific compliance frameworks
terrascan scan -t aws -i terraform -d ./terraform/ \
--policy-type aws \
--categories "Compliance Validation"
# Output in JSON
terrascan scan -t aws -i terraform -d ./terraform/ \
--output json > terrascan-results.json
# Scan a Terraform plan
terrascan scan -t aws -i terraform \
--iac-file tfplan.json \
--iac-type tfplan
# List available policies
terrascan scan --list-policies -t awsStep 4: Create Custom OPA Policies for Organization Standards
Write Rego policies for organization-specific security requirements.
# policy/aws_s3_encryption.rego
package terraform.aws.s3
deny[msg] {
resource := input.resource.aws_s3_bucket[name]
not resource.server_side_encryption_configuration
msg := sprintf("S3 bucket '%s' must have server-side encryption enabled", [name])
}
# policy/aws_iam_no_wildcards.rego
package terraform.aws.iam
deny[msg] {
resource := input.resource.aws_iam_policy[name]
statement := resource.policy.Statement[_]
statement.Action == "*"
statement.Effect == "Allow"
msg := sprintf("IAM policy '%s' must not use wildcard (*) actions", [name])
}
deny[msg] {
resource := input.resource.aws_iam_policy[name]
statement := resource.policy.Statement[_]
statement.Resource == "*"
statement.Effect == "Allow"
contains(statement.Action[_], "*")
msg := sprintf("IAM policy '%s' has overly permissive actions on wildcard resources", [name])
}
# policy/aws_no_public_ingress.rego
package terraform.aws.security_group
deny[msg] {
resource := input.resource.aws_security_group_rule[name]
resource.type == "ingress"
resource.cidr_blocks[_] == "0.0.0.0/0"
resource.from_port <= 22
resource.to_port >= 22
msg := sprintf("Security gro# Evaluate Terraform plan against OPA policies
terraform show -json tfplan | opa eval \
--data ./policy/ \
--input /dev/stdin \
"data.terraform.aws" \
--format pretty
# Run Conftest for easier OPA policy testing
conftest test tfplan.json --policy ./policy/ --output jsonStep 5: Integrate Security Scanning into CI/CD Pipeline
Add IaC security scanning as a mandatory CI/CD gate.
# GitHub Actions: Terraform security pipeline
name: Terraform Security Scan
on:
pull_request:
paths: ['terraform/**']
jobs:
security-scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Setup Terraform
uses: hashicorp/setup-terraform@v3
- name: Terraform Init & Plan
run: |
cd terraform/
terraform init
terraform plan -out=tfplan
terraform show -json tfplan > tfplan.json
- name: Checkov Scan
uses: bridgecrewio/checkov-action@master
with:
directory: terraform/
framework: terraform
output_format: sarif
output_file_path: checkov.sarif
soft_fail: false
- name: tfsec Scan
uses: aquasecurity/tfsec-action@v1.0.0
with:
working_directory: terraform/
soft_fail: false
- name: Upload SARIF
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v2
with:
sarif_file: checkov.sarif
- name: OPA Policy Check
run: |
conftest test terraform/tfplan.json \
--policy ./policy/ \
--output jsonStep 6: Scan Terraform State for Deployed Misconfigurations
Audit the current Terraform state to identify already-deployed security issues.
# Export current state as JSON
terraform show -json > terraform-state.json
# Scan the state with Checkov
checkov -f terraform-state.json --framework terraform_plan
# Query state for specific security issues
terraform state list | while read resource; do
terraform state show "$resource" 2>/dev/null | grep -i "public\|0.0.0.0\|encrypt.*false\|password"
done
# Find resources without required tags
terraform state list | grep aws_instance | while read resource; do
tags=$(terraform state show "$resource" | grep -A20 "tags")
if ! echo "$tags" | grep -q "Environment"; then
echo "MISSING TAG: $resource lacks 'Environment' tag"
fi
doneKey Concepts
Tools & Systems
- Checkov: Comprehensive IaC scanner with 1000+ policies for Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, ARM, and Dockerfile
- tfsec: Terraform-specific static analysis tool with detailed remediation guidance and SARIF output
- Terrascan: Multi-IaC scanner supporting compliance frameworks (CIS, NIST, SOC 2) with policy-as-code
- OPA/Conftest: Custom policy engine for defining organization-specific security rules using Rego language
- Bridgecrew: Commercial platform built on Checkov providing drift detection and supply chain security
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Adding Security Gates to an Existing Terraform CI/CD Pipeline
Context: A DevOps team deploys infrastructure via Terraform in GitHub Actions but has no security scanning. Recent audit findings show multiple S3 buckets without encryption and security groups allowing SSH from the internet.
Approach:
- Add Checkov as the first security gate in the GitHub Actions workflow
- Run checkov -d ./terraform/ to establish the current baseline of findings
- Triage existing findings: fix CRITICAL issues, create tickets for HIGH, suppress accepted risks
- Add tfsec as a secondary scanner for Terraform-specific checks
- Write custom OPA policies for organization standards (required tags, naming conventions)
- Configure the pipeline to block PRs with CRITICAL or HIGH findings
- Generate SARIF reports for GitHub Security tab integration
Pitfalls: Adding security scanning to an existing project will initially produce hundreds of findings. Implement gradually by starting with CRITICAL-only blocking, then expanding to HIGH. Use inline suppression comments (#checkov:skip=CKVAWS18:Public bucket for static website) for intentional exceptions with documented justification.
Output Format
Terraform Security Audit Report
==================================
Repository: acme-corp/infrastructure
Branch: main
Scan Date: 2026-02-23
Tools: Checkov 3.x, tfsec 1.x, OPA custom policies
SCAN RESULTS:
Checkov checks passed: 187
Checkov checks failed: 34
tfsec checks passed: 156
tfsec checks failed: 28
OPA custom policies: 12 passed, 3 failed
CRITICAL FINDINGS:
[TF-001] S3 Bucket Without Encryption
File: modules/storage/main.tf:24
Resource: aws_s3_bucket.data_lake
Check: CKV_AWS_19
Fix: Add server_side_encryption_configuration block
[TF-002] Security Group Allows SSH from 0.0.0.0/0
File: modules/network/security.tf:45
Resource: aws_security_group_rule.ssh_access
Check: CKV_AWS_24
Fix: Restrict cidr_blocks to bastion subnet
[TF-003] IAM Policy with Wildcard Actions
File: modules/iam/policies.tf:12
Resource: aws_iam_policy.developer_policy
Check: CKV_AWS_1
Fix: Scope actions to specific services required
SUMMARY BY SEVERITY:
Critical: 6 findings
High: 14 findings
Medium: 28 findings
Low: 18 findings
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