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analyzing-indicators-of-compromise skill

by mukul975·mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills·34k stars·Apache-2.0

'Analyzes indicators of compromise (IOCs) including IP addresses, domains,

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Install the analyzing-indicators-of-compromise skill

A skill is a folder. Copy it into your agent's skills folder and the agent loads it when the task matches its description.

git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git /tmp/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills
cp -r /tmp/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/analyzing-indicators-of-compromise ~/.claude/skills/analyzing-indicators-of-compromise
available in every project

In the Claude apps, zip the folder and upload it from the Skills settings. The folder on GitHub

The instructions your agent would load

SKILL.md as published, without the frontmatter. Read it on GitHub

Analyzing Indicators of Compromise

When to Use

Use this skill when:

  • A phishing email or alert generates IOCs (URLs, IP addresses, file hashes) requiring rapid triage
  • Automated feeds deliver bulk IOCs that need confidence scoring before ingestion into blocking controls
  • An incident investigation requires contextual enrichment of observed network artifacts

Do not use this skill in isolation for high-stakes blocking decisions — always combine automated enrichment with analyst judgment, especially for shared infrastructure (CDNs, cloud providers).

Prerequisites

  • VirusTotal API key (free or Enterprise) for multi-AV and sandbox lookup
  • AbuseIPDB API key for IP reputation checks
  • MISP instance or TIP for cross-referencing against known campaigns
  • Python with requests and vt-py libraries, or SOAR platform with pre-built connectors

Workflow

Step 1: Normalize and Classify IOC Types

Before enriching, classify each IOC:

  • IPv4/IPv6 address: Check if RFC 1918 private (skip external enrichment), validate format
  • Domain/FQDN: Defang for safe handling (evil[.]com), extract registered domain via tldextract
  • URL: Extract domain + path separately; check for redirectors
  • File hash: Identify hash type (MD5/SHA-1/SHA-256); prefer SHA-256 for uniqueness
  • Email address: Split into domain (check MX/DMARC) and local part for pattern analysis

Defang IOCs in documentation (replace . with [.] and :// with [://]) to prevent accidental clicks.

Step 2: Multi-Source Enrichment

VirusTotal (file hash, URL, IP, domain):

import vt

client = vt.Client("YOUR_VT_API_KEY")

# File hash lookup
file_obj = client.get_object(f"/files/{sha256_hash}")
detections = file_obj.last_analysis_stats
print(f"Malicious: {detections['malicious']}/{sum(detections.values())}")

# Domain analysis
domain_obj = client.get_object(f"/domains/{domain}")
print(domain_obj.last_analysis_stats)
print(domain_obj.reputation)
client.close()

AbuseIPDB (IP addresses):

import requests

response = requests.get(
    "https://api.abuseipdb.com/api/v2/check",
    headers={"Key": "YOUR_KEY", "Accept": "application/json"},
    params={"ipAddress": "1.2.3.4", "maxAgeInDays": 90}
)
data = response.json()["data"]
print(f"Confidence: {data['abuseConfidenceScore']}%, Reports: {data['totalReports']}")

MalwareBazaar (file hashes):

response = requests.post(
    "https://mb-api.abuse.ch/api/v1/",
    data={"query": "get_info", "hash": sha256_hash}
)
result = response.json()
if result["query_status"] == "ok":
    print(result["data"][0]["tags"], result["data"][0]["signature"])

Step 3: Contextualize with Campaign Attribution

Query MISP for existing events matching the IOC:

from pymisp import PyMISP

misp = PyMISP("https://misp.example.com", "API_KEY")
results = misp.search(value="evil-domain.com", type_attribute="domain")
for event in results:
    print(event["Event"]["info"], event["Event"]["threat_level_id"])

Check Shodan for IP context (hosting provider, open ports, banners) to identify if the IP belongs to bulletproof hosting or a legitimate cloud provider (false positive risk).

Step 4: Assign Confidence Score and Disposition

Apply a tiered decision framework:

  • Block (High Confidence ≥ 70%): ≥15 AV detections on VT, AbuseIPDB score ≥70, matches known malware family or campaign
  • Monitor/Alert (Medium 40–69%): 5–14 AV detections, moderate AbuseIPDB score, no campaign attribution
  • Whitelist/Investigate (Low <40%): ≤4 AV detections, no abuse reports, legitimate service (Google, Cloudflare CDN IPs)
  • False Positive: Legitimate business service incorrectly flagged; document and exclude from future alerts

Step 5: Document and Distribute

Record findings in TIP/MISP with:

  • All enrichment data collected (timestamps, source, score)
  • Disposition decision and rationale
  • Blocking actions taken (firewall, proxy, DNS sinkhole)
  • Related incident ticket number

Export to STIX indicator object with confidence field set appropriately.

Key Concepts

Tools & Systems

  • VirusTotal: Multi-engine malware scanner and threat intelligence platform with 70+ AV engines, sandbox reports, and community comments
  • AbuseIPDB: Community-maintained IP reputation database with 90-day abuse report history
  • MalwareBazaar (abuse.ch): Free malware hash repository with YARA rule associations and malware family tagging
  • URLScan.io: Free URL analysis service that captures screenshots, DOM, and network requests for phishing URL triage
  • Shodan: Internet-wide scan data providing hosting provider, open ports, and banner information for IP enrichment

Common Pitfalls

  • Blocking shared infrastructure: CDN IPs (Cloudflare 104.21.x.x, AWS CloudFront) may legitimately host malicious content but blocking the IP disrupts thousands of legitimate sites.
  • VT score obsession: Low VT detection count does not mean benign — zero-day malware and custom APT tools often score 0 initially. Check sandbox behavior, MISP, and passive DNS.
  • Missing defanging: Pasting live IOCs in emails or Confluence docs can trigger automated URL scanners or phishing tools.
  • No expiration policy: IOCs without TTLs accumulate in blocklists indefinitely, generating false positives as infrastructure is repurposed by legitimate users.
  • Over-relying on single source: VirusTotal aggregates AV opinions — all may be wrong or lag behind emerging malware. Use 3+ independent sources for high-stakes decisions.

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