analyzing-golang-malware-with-ghidra skill
Reverse engineer Go-compiled malware in Ghidra by parsing Go buildinfo
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A skill is a folder. Copy it into your agent's skills folder and the agent loads it when the task matches its description.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git /tmp/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills cp -r /tmp/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/analyzing-golang-malware-with-ghidra ~/.claude/skills/analyzing-golang-malware-with-ghidra
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SKILL.md as published, without the frontmatter. Read it on GitHub
Analyzing Golang Malware with Ghidra
Overview
Go (Golang) has become a popular language for malware authors due to its cross-compilation capabilities, static linking that produces self-contained binaries, and the complexity it introduces for reverse engineering. Go binaries contain the entire runtime, standard library, and all dependencies statically linked, resulting in large binaries (often 5-15MB) with thousands of functions. Ghidra struggles with Go-specific string formats (non-null-terminated), stripped function names, and goroutine concurrency patterns. Specialized tools like GoResolver (Volexity, 2025) use control-flow graph similarity to automatically deobfuscate and recover function names in stripped or obfuscated Go binaries.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing golang malware with ghidra
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Ghidra 11.0+ with JDK 17+
- GoResolver plugin (for function name recovery)
- Go Reverse Engineering Tool Kit (go-re.tk)
- Python 3.9+ for helper scripts
- Understanding of Go runtime internals (goroutines, channels, interfaces)
- Familiarity with Go binary structure (pclntab, moduledata, itab)
Key Concepts
Go Binary Structure
Go binaries embed rich metadata in the pclntab (PC Line Table) structure, which maps program counters to function names, source files, and line numbers. Even stripped binaries retain this metadata. The moduledata structure contains pointers to type information, itabs (interface tables), and the pclntab itself. Go strings are stored as a pointer-length pair rather than null-terminated C strings.
Function Recovery in Stripped Binaries
Despite stripping symbol tables, Go binaries retain function names within the pclntab. However, obfuscation tools like garble rename functions to random strings. GoResolver addresses this by computing control-flow graph signatures of obfuscated functions and matching them against a database of known Go standard library and third-party package functions.
Crate/Dependency Extraction
Go's dependency management embeds module paths and version strings in the binary. Extracting these reveals the malware's third-party dependencies (HTTP libraries, encryption packages, C2 frameworks), which provides insight into capabilities without full reverse engineering.
Workflow
Step 1: Initial Binary Analysis
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Analyze Go binary metadata for malware analysis."""
import struct
import sys
import re
def find_go_build_info(data):
"""Extract Go build information from binary."""
# Go buildinfo magic: \xff Go buildinf:
magic = b'\xff Go buildinf:'
offset = data.find(magic)
if offset == -1:
return None
print(f"[+] Go build info at offset 0x{offset:x}")
# Extract Go version string nearby
go_version = re.search(rb'go\d+\.\d+(?:\.\d+)?', data[offset:offset+256])
if go_version:
print(f" Go Version: {go_version.group().decode()}")
return offset
def find_pclntab(data):
"""Locate the pclntab (PC Line Table) structure."""
# pclntab magic bytes vary by Go version
magics = {
b'\xfb\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00': "Go 1.2-1.15",
b'\xfa\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00': "Go 1.16-1.17",
b'\xf1\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00': "Go 1.18-1.19",
b'\xf0\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00': "Go 1.20+",
}
for magic, version in magics.items():
offset = data.find(magic)
if offset != -1:
print(f"[+] pclntab found at 0x{offset:x} ({version})")
return offset, version
return None, NonStep 2: Ghidra Analysis Script
# Ghidra script (run within Ghidra's script manager)
# Save as AnalyzeGoBinary.py in Ghidra scripts directory
# @category MalwareAnalysis
# @description Analyze Go binary structure and recover metadata
def analyze_go_binary_ghidra():
"""Ghidra script for Go binary analysis."""
from ghidra.program.model.mem import MemoryAccessException
program = getCurrentProgram()
memory = program.getMemory()
listing = program.getListing()
print("[+] Go Binary Analysis Script")
print(f" Program: {program.getName()}")
# Find pclntab
pclntab_magics = [
bytes([0xf0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff]), # Go 1.20+
bytes([0xf1, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff]), # Go 1.18-1.19
bytes([0xfa, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff]), # Go 1.16-1.17
bytes([0xfb, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff]), # Go 1.2-1.15
]
for magic in pclntab_magics:
addr = memory.findBytes(
program.getMinAddress(), magic, None, True, None
)
if addr:
print(f"[+] pclntab found at {addr}")
# Create label
program.getSymbolTable().createLabel(
addr, "go_pclntab", None,
ghidra.program.model.symbol.SourceType.ANALYSIS
Validation Criteria
- Go version and build information extracted from binary
- pclntab located and parsed for function name recovery
- Third-party dependencies identified revealing malware capabilities
- Main package functions enumerated for targeted analysis
- Network, crypto, and OS exec functions categorized
- Ghidra analysis correctly labels Go runtime structures
References
- CUJO AI - Reverse Engineering Go Binaries with Ghidra
- Volexity GoResolver
- Go Reverse Engineering Tool Kit
- SentinelOne AlphaGolang
- Go Binary Reversing Notes
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