analyzing-command-and-control-communication skill
'Analyzes malware C2 communication over HTTP, HTTPS, DNS, and custom
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Install the analyzing-command-and-control-communication skill
A skill is a folder. Copy it into your agent's skills folder and the agent loads it when the task matches its description.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git /tmp/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills cp -r /tmp/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/analyzing-command-and-control-communication ~/.claude/skills/analyzing-command-and-control-communication
In the Claude apps, zip the folder and upload it from the Skills settings. The folder on GitHub
The instructions your agent would load
SKILL.md as published, without the frontmatter. Read it on GitHub
Analyzing Command-and-Control Communication
When to Use
- Reverse engineering a malware sample has revealed network communication that needs protocol analysis
- Building network-level detection signatures for a specific C2 framework (Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Sliver)
- Mapping C2 infrastructure including primary servers, fallback domains, and dead drops
- Analyzing encrypted or encoded C2 traffic to understand the command set and data format
- Attributing malware to a threat actor based on C2 infrastructure patterns and tooling
Do not use for general network anomaly detection; this is specifically for understanding known or suspected C2 protocols from malware analysis.
Prerequisites
- PCAP capture of malware network traffic (from sandbox, network tap, or full packet capture)
- Wireshark/tshark for packet-level analysis
- Reverse engineering tools (Ghidra, dnSpy) for understanding C2 code in the malware binary
- Python 3.8+ with scapy, dpkt, and requests for protocol analysis and replay
- Threat intelligence databases for C2 infrastructure correlation (VirusTotal, Shodan, Censys)
- JA3/JA3S fingerprint databases for TLS-based C2 identification
Workflow
Step 1: Identify the C2 Channel
Determine the protocol and transport used for C2 communication:
C2 Communication Channels:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
HTTP/HTTPS: Most common; uses standard web traffic to blend in
Indicators: Regular POST/GET requests, specific URI patterns, custom headers
DNS: Tunneling data through DNS queries and responses
Indicators: High-volume TXT queries, long subdomain names, high entropy
Custom TCP/UDP: Proprietary binary protocol on non-standard port
Indicators: Non-HTTP traffic on high ports, unknown protocol
ICMP: Data encoded in ICMP echo/reply payloads
Indicators: ICMP packets with large or non-standard payloads
WebSocket: Persistent bidirectional connection for real-time C2
Indicators: WebSocket upgrade followed by binary frames
Cloud Services: Using legitimate APIs (Telegram, Discord, Slack, GitHub)
Indicators: API calls to cloud services from unexpected processes
Email: SMTP/IMAP for C2 commands and data exfiltration
Indicators: Automated email operations from non-email processesStep 2: Analyze Beacon Pattern
Characterize the periodic communication pattern:
from scapy.all import rdpcap, IP, TCP
from collections import defaultdict
import statistics
import json
packets = rdpcap("c2_traffic.pcap")
# Group TCP SYN packets by destination
connections = defaultdict(list)
for pkt in packets:
if IP in pkt and TCP in pkt and (pkt[TCP].flags & 0x02):
key = f"{pkt[IP].dst}:{pkt[TCP].dport}"
connections[key].append(float(pkt.time))
# Analyze each destination for beaconing
for dst, times in sorted(connections.items()):
if len(times) < 3:
continue
intervals = [times[i+1] - times[i] for i in range(len(times)-1)]
avg_interval = statistics.mean(intervals)
stdev = statistics.stdev(intervals) if len(intervals) > 1 else 0
jitter_pct = (stdev / avg_interval * 100) if avg_interval > 0 else 0
duration = times[-1] - times[0]
beacon_data = {
"destination": dst,
"connections": len(times),
"duration_seconds": round(duration, 1),
"avg_interval_seconds": round(avg_interval, 1),
"stdev_seconds": round(stdev, 1),
"jitter_percent": round(jitter_pct, 1),
"is_beacon": 5 < avg_interval < 7200 and jitter_pct < 25,
}
if beacon_data["is_beacon"]:
Step 3: Decode C2 Protocol Structure
Reverse engineer the message format from captured traffic:
# HTTP-based C2 protocol analysis
import dpkt
import base64
with open("c2_traffic.pcap", "rb") as f:
pcap = dpkt.pcap.Reader(f)
for ts, buf in pcap:
eth = dpkt.ethernet.Ethernet(buf)
if not isinstance(eth.data, dpkt.ip.IP):
continue
ip = eth.data
if not isinstance(ip.data, dpkt.tcp.TCP):
continue
tcp = ip.data
if tcp.dport == 80 or tcp.dport == 443:
if len(tcp.data) > 0:
try:
http = dpkt.http.Request(tcp.data)
print(f"\n--- C2 REQUEST ---")
print(f"Method: {http.method}")
print(f"URI: {http.uri}")
print(f"Headers: {dict(http.headers)}")
if http.body:
print(f"Body ({len(http.body)} bytes):")
# Try Base64 decode
try:
decoded = base64.b64decode(http.body)
print(f" Decoded: {decoded[:200]}")
except:
print(f" Raw: {http.body[:200]}")
except:
passStep 4: Identify C2 Framework
Match observed patterns to known C2 frameworks:
Known C2 Framework Signatures:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Cobalt Strike:
- Default URIs: /pixel, /submit.php, /___utm.gif, /ca, /dpixel
- Malleable C2 profiles customize all traffic characteristics
- JA3: varies by profile, catalog at ja3er.com
- Watermark in beacon config (unique per license)
- Config extraction: use CobaltStrikeParser or 1768.py
Metasploit/Meterpreter:
- Default staging URI patterns: random 4-char checksum
- Reverse HTTP(S) handler patterns
- Meterpreter TLV (Type-Length-Value) protocol structure
Sliver:
- mTLS, HTTP, DNS, WireGuard transport options
- Protobuf-encoded messages
- Unique implant ID in communication
Covenant:
- .NET-based C2 framework
- HTTP with customizable profiles
- Task-based command execution
PoshC2:
- PowerShell/C# based
- HTTP with encrypted payloads
- Cookie-based session management# Extract Cobalt Strike beacon configuration from PCAP or sample
python3 << 'PYEOF'
# Using CobaltStrikeParser (pip install cobalt-strike-parser)
from cobalt_strike_parser import BeaconConfig
try:
config = BeaconConfig.from_file("suspect.exe")
print("Cobalt Strike Beacon Configuration:")
for key, value in config.items():
print(f" {key}: {value}")
except Exception as e:
print(f"Not a Cobalt Strike beacon or parse error: {e}")
PYEOFStep 5: Map C2 Infrastructure
Document the full C2 infrastructure and failover mechanisms:
# Infrastructure mapping
import requests
import json
c2_indicators = {
"primary_c2": "185.220.101.42",
"domains": ["update.malicious.com", "backup.evil.net"],
"ports": [443, 8443],
"failover_dns": ["ns1.malicious-dns.com"],
}
# Enrich with Shodan
def shodan_lookup(ip, api_key):
resp = requests.get(f"https://api.shodan.io/shodan/host/{ip}?key={api_key}")
if resp.status_code == 200:
data = resp.json()
return {
"ip": ip,
"ports": data.get("ports", []),
"os": data.get("os"),
"org": data.get("org"),
"asn": data.get("asn"),
"country": data.get("country_code"),
"hostnames": data.get("hostnames", []),
"last_update": data.get("last_update"),
}
return None
# Enrich with passive DNS
def pdns_lookup(domain):
# Using VirusTotal passive DNS
resp = requests.get(
f"https://www.virustotal.com/api/v3/domains/{domain}/resolutions",
headers={"x-apikey": VT_API_KEY}
)
if resp.status_code == 200:
data = resp.json()
resolutions = []
for r in data.get("data", []):
resolutions.append({
Step 6: Create Network Detection Signatures
Build detection rules based on analyzed C2 characteristics:
# Suricata rules for the analyzed C2
cat << 'EOF' > c2_detection.rules
# HTTP beacon pattern
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
msg:"MALWARE MalwareX C2 HTTP Beacon";
flow:established,to_server;
http.method; content:"POST";
http.uri; content:"/gate.php"; startswith;
http.header; content:"User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0)";
threshold:type threshold, track by_src, count 5, seconds 600;
sid:9000010; rev:1;
)
# JA3 fingerprint match
alert tls $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
msg:"MALWARE MalwareX TLS JA3 Fingerprint";
ja3.hash; content:"a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1";
sid:9000011; rev:1;
)
# DNS beacon detection (high-entropy subdomain)
alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any any (
msg:"MALWARE Suspected DNS C2 Tunneling";
dns.query; pcre:"/^[a-z0-9]{20,}\./";
threshold:type threshold, track by_src, count 10, seconds 60;
sid:9000012; rev:1;
)
# Certificate-based detection
alert tls $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
msg:"MALWARE MalwareX Self-Signed C2 Certificate";
tls.cert_subject; content:"CN=update.malicious.com";
sid:9000013; rev:1;
)
EOFKey Concepts
Tools & Systems
- Wireshark: Packet analyzer for detailed C2 protocol analysis at the packet level
- RITA (Real Intelligence Threat Analytics): Open-source tool analyzing Zeek logs for beacon detection and DNS tunneling
- CobaltStrikeParser: Tool extracting Cobalt Strike beacon configuration from samples and memory dumps
- JA3/JA3S: TLS fingerprinting method for identifying C2 frameworks by their TLS implementation characteristics
- Shodan/Censys: Internet scanning platforms for mapping C2 infrastructure and identifying related servers
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Reverse Engineering a Custom C2 Protocol
Context: A malware sample communicates with its C2 server using an unknown binary protocol over TCP port 8443. The protocol needs to be decoded to understand the command set and build detection signatures.
Approach:
- Filter PCAP for TCP port 8443 conversations and extract the TCP streams
- Analyze the first few exchanges to identify the handshake/authentication mechanism
- Map the message structure (length prefix, type field, payload encoding)
- Cross-reference with Ghidra disassembly of the send/receive functions in the malware
- Identify the command dispatcher and document each command code's function
- Build a protocol decoder in Python for ongoing traffic analysis
- Create Suricata rules matching the protocol handshake or static header bytes
Pitfalls:
- Assuming the protocol is static; some C2 frameworks negotiate encryption during the handshake
- Not capturing enough traffic to see all command types (some commands are rare)
- Missing fallback C2 channels (DNS, ICMP) that activate when the primary channel fails
- Confusing encrypted payload data with the protocol framing structure
Output Format
C2 COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS REPORT
===================================
Sample: malware.exe (SHA-256: e3b0c44...)
C2 Framework: Cobalt Strike 4.9
BEACON CONFIGURATION
C2 Server: hxxps://185.220.101[.]42/updates
Beacon Type: HTTPS (reverse)
Sleep: 60 seconds
Jitter: 15%
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)
URI (GET): /dpixel
URI (POST): /submit.php
Watermark: 1234567890
PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
Transport: HTTPS (TLS 1.2)
JA3 Hash: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1
Certificate: CN=Microsoft Update (self-signed)
Encoding: Base64 with XOR key 0x69
Command Format: [4B length][4B command_id][payload]
COMMAND SET
0x01 - Sleep Change beacon interval
0x02 - Shell Execute cmd.exe command
0x03 - Download Transfer file from C2
0x04 - Upload Exfiltrate file to C2
0x05 - Inject Process injection
0x06 - Keylog Start keylogger
0x07 - Screenshot Capture screen
INFRASTRUCTURE
Primary: 185.220.101[.]42 (AS12345, Hosting Co, NL)
Failover: 91.215.85[.]17 (AS67890, VPS Provider, RU)
DNS: update.malicious[.]com -More skills from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
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