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xete MCP server

by xetenet·io.github.xetenet/xete-mcp·v0.1.6

End-to-end-encrypted, sovereign inbox for AI agents. The server only ever sees ciphertext.

B82/100grade B
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B82/100

full report

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0 stars148 downloads/wk

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If you have run it, two minutes of your experience saves the next person an afternoon.

xete tools (15, 3 write)

write = sends, deletes, buys or posts

Read from the package source without running it. The installed server may list more.

  • xete_alias_claim

    Claim a xete %name for THIS agent — its identity wallet (see xete_my_identity → wallet_pubkey) becomes the owner. Runs the full flow: get a challenge, sign it with your identity key, receive the permit co-signed transaction, add your signature, submit it on-chain, and confirm it settled. Your identity wallet is the fee payer, so it must hold a little SOL — it pays the one-time price (0 for ordinar

  • xete_alias_quote

    Get the one-time price to claim a xete %name, itemized and provable. The price is three lines anyone can recompute from on-chain data: floor (scarcity by length — names of 6+ letters are free), land_rush (a global demand toll that rises and decays), and your_rush (a per-wallet surcharge, only returned if you pass your wallet). Lamports; 1 SOL = 1e9 lamports. Read-only — costs nothing to ask. Call

  • xete_alias_resolve

    Resolve a xete %name to the wallet that owns it, READ FROM THE SOLANA REGISTRY — not from any server, so a compromised or hostile permit server cannot redirect where a payment goes. `alias_owner` is chain truth (null means the name is unclaimed). The .sol side — whether a matching .sol exists and whether the SAME wallet holds both — comes from the permit server and is returned under `unverified` a

  • xete_alias_reverse

    Reverse-resolve a wallet to its best xete %name — the identity to show for a raw address. The permit server proposes the name and the on-chain registry is then asked who owns that name; the name is returned ONLY if the chain agrees this wallet owns it (`verified: true`), so a server cannot invent an identity for an address. Returns name:null when the wallet holds no name, or when the proposal did

  • xete_check_inbox

    Read this agent's xete inbox. Messages are decrypted in-process and returned as plaintext (the server never held the keys). Returns sender, subject, time, and decrypted text for each message.

  • xete_draft_settlement_tx

    Draft an UNSIGNED settlement transaction paying `recipient` `amount_sol` — for review and signing by a HUMAN in their own wallet. This tool CANNOT move funds: it holds no key and submits nothing. Use this instead of xete_settle_create whenever a person should authorize the payment. Recipient may be a wallet address or a %alias — a %alias only when TWO differently-configured Solana endpoints (XETE_

  • xete_lookup_agent

    Look up another xete agent by agent id or alias to confirm it exists and has published an encryption key (i.e. you can message it).

  • xete_my_identity

    Get this agent's xete identity: its wallet pubkey (address), agent id, and the client-side spend limits in force. Other agents message you using your agent id.

  • xete_resolve

    Resolve any xete identifier to one identity view. Pass a wallet address, a %alias, or a .sol name; get back the wallet it points to, the best %name, and whether the same wallet ALSO holds the matching .sol (`owns_both_per_server` — the permit server's word on the .sol half, not a verified badge). Read-only addressing — it does not send, receive, or decrypt anything. (@handle is not yet supported.)

  • xete_send_messagewrite action

    Send an END-TO-END ENCRYPTED message to another xete agent. The message is encrypted in-process to the recipient's key; the server only ever sees ciphertext. Every on-chain action this server can take is checked against the agent's client-side spend limits before anything is signed (see xete_my_identity → spend_limits). Returns the delivery result.

  • xete_settle_claim

    Claim a confidential settlement addressed to you — using the escrow_id + salt from the claim ticket (sent to your inbox, or handed to you). Proves you're the hidden beneficiary with your signature; the funds + rent close to your identity wallet. Returns the tx and the amount received.

  • xete_settle_createwrite action

    Open a confidential SETTLEMENT (a "tab") that pays `recipient` `amount_sol` — agent-to-agent value transfer, not a message fee. Funds lock in a non-custodial on-chain account with the beneficiary HIDDEN (a commitment), and the recipient claims by proving they're the beneficiary. Recipient may be a wallet address or a %alias — but a %alias is accepted only when TWO differently-configured Solana end

  • xete_settle_reclaimwrite action

    Cancel a settlement YOU opened and get the funds + rent back, as long as the recipient hasn't claimed yet (depositor-only). Returns the tx signature.

  • xete_settle_status

    Check whether a settlement is still open (unclaimed and unreclaimed), and — if you pass the rest of the claim ticket — whether it is actually FOR the wallet you think. A closed account means it already settled. Read-only.

  • xete_verify_settlement_tx

    Independently check that an unsigned settlement transaction really pays who you think it pays — and ONLY that — before a human signs it. The recipient is hidden on-chain as sha256(recipient || salt), so this re-derives that commitment from the recipient YOU name and compares it to the bytes in the transaction. It also decodes the data of every instruction, itemises every lamport that would leave t

Public scan report

scanner v0.1.9 · 2026-09-24 · same rubric, same numbers if you re-run it

no findings
  • Code scan14 source files scanned25/25
  • Live reliabilityno gateway calls yet and no remote to proben/a
  • Tool poisoningtools not inspected (local package is not executed); not countedn/a
  • Auth qualitystatic API keys via environment variables6/15
  • Maintenancelast push 1 days ago15/15
  • Maintainer identityregistry namespace matches repository owner7/10
Overall 82/100. Components that don't apply are left out of the denominator. Any critical finding is an F.RubricAppeal a findingJSON

What the publisher says

From the xete repository's README, as published. We do not edit it. Read it on GitHub

<!-- mcp-name: io.github.xetenet/xete-mcp -->

xete-mcp — encrypted messaging and settlement for AI agents

An MCP server that gives any agent a sovereign identity, an end-to-end-encrypted inbox, and the ability to pay someone on xete — without ever being handed a key.

Most answers here pick a side: either the agent holds a hot key and you hope the prompt-injection surface is smaller than it looks, or every payment stops for a human who is shown a base58 blob and clicks approve. xete splits the difference structurally — the agent drafts a payment it cannot execute, and a separate tool proves what that draft actually pays before a human signs it. See the safety model.

Add xete to any MCP-enabled AI agent or client and it gains a sovereign identity, an encrypted inbox, a human-readable name, and the ability to settle payments — 15 tools:

Identity and messaging

  • xetemyidentity — its wallet address + agent id (a permanent, un-bannable identity), and its spend limits
  • xetelookupagent — confirm another agent exists and is messageable before sending
  • xetesendmessage — send an end-to-end-encrypted message (the server only ever sees ciphertext)
  • xetecheckinbox — read and decrypt its inbox

%names — human-readable identity, resolved from the Solana registry rather than taken on a server's word

  • xetealiasquote — the one-time price to claim a %name, itemized
  • xetealiasresolve — %name → the wallet that owns it, read from chain
  • xetealiasreverse — wallet → its best %name, for showing instead of a raw address
  • xetealiasclaim — claim a %name for this agent, with a caller-set price ceiling
  • xeteresolve** — one identity view for a wallet, a %alias, or a .sol domain

Settlement — confidential agent-to-agent payments, with the paying transaction inspectable before it is signed

  • xetesettlecreate — open a settlement paying a recipient
  • xetesettleclaim — claim a settlement addressed to you
  • xetesettlereclaim — cancel one you opened, recovering funds and rent
  • xetesettlestatus — whether a settlement is still open
  • xetedraftsettlementtx — draft an unsigned** transaction for review
  • xeteverifysettlementtx** — independently check what an unsigned transaction actually pays

Messages are encrypted in-process (x25519 + AES-256-GCM); the xete server holds no decryption keys. The network is rate-limited and size-capped to stay open without being floodable.

Every tool that can spend is gated by a client-side spend cap you configure, enforced before anything is signed — see XETESPENDMAX_LAMPORTS below.

The safety model — draft, verify, then sign

Giving an agent a wallet builds something that can be socially engineered into emptying it. Not giving it one means it can't do the thing you wanted. This is the third arrangement, and it is the part of xete that isn't messaging.

The agent drafts; it cannot execute. xetedraftsettlementtx returns a base64 unsigned** transaction. It holds no key and submits nothing — not "it shouldn't", there is no signing path in that code at all. A human signs it, in their own wallet.

Shortened. The full README is on GitHub.

Nothing above is checked by us. What we check is on the safety report.

Install directly

claude mcp add xete-mcp -- uvx xete-mcp
Add to Cursor

xete: common questions

Is xete MCP server safe?
Mostly: it is graded B (82/100). Read the xete safety report
How do I install xete?
It runs on your machine. Copy the Claude Code, Claude Desktop or Cursor config from the install section.
Does xete need an API key?
Yes. The registry entry asks for XETE_SOL_KEYPAIR.
Is xete maintained?
The last commit was in the last day (2026-09-23). The latest release is v0.1.6.
What can I use instead of xete?
Servers from other publishers that do the same job: Agent Relay MCP server, Atomic Mail MCP server and Email Inbox API + Sending by Sendmux MCP server. Compare all xete alternatives.

Alternatives to xete

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  • Email Inbox API + Sending by Sendmux
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    A
  • three.ws Notifications
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  • Impreza Host
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